Related papers: Walraswap: a solution to uniform price batch aucti…
We propose a mathematically rigorous framework for identifying and completing Coincidence of Wants (CoW) cycles in decentralized exchange (DEX) aggregators. Unlike existing auction based systems such as CoWSwap, our approach introduces an…
An automated market maker (AMM) is a state machine that manages pools of assets, allowing parties to buy and sell those assets according to a fixed mathematical formula. AMMs are typically implemented as smart contracts on blockchains, and…
In standard Walrasian auctions, the price of a good is defined as the point where the supply and demand curves intersect. Since both curves are generically regular, the response to small perturbations is linearly small. However, a crucial…
In decentralized finance ("DeFi"), automated market makers (AMMs) enable traders to programmatically exchange one asset for another. Such trades are enabled by the assets deposited by liquidity providers (LPs). The goal of this paper is to…
A classical trading experiment consists of a set of unit demand buyers and unit supply sellers with identical items. Each agent's value or opportunity cost for the item is their private information and preferences are quasi-linear. Trade…
We design a simple ascending-price algorithm to compute a $(1+\varepsilon)$-approximate equilibrium in Arrow-Debreu exchange markets with weak gross substitute (WGS) property, which runs in time polynomial in market parameters and $\log…
We present an automated market-making (AMM) cross-settlement mechanism for digital assets on interoperable blockchains, focusing on central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) and stable coins. We develop an innovative approach for generating…
Designing automated market makers (AMMs) for prediction markets on combinatorial securities over large outcome spaces poses significant computational challenges. Prior research has primarily focused on combinatorial prediction markets…
Automated Market Makers (AMMs) have cemented themselves as an integral part of the decentralized finance (DeFi) space. AMMs are a type of exchange that allows users to trade assets without the need for a centralized exchange. They form the…
Centralized monetary policy, leading to persistent inflation, is often inconsistent, untrustworthy, and unpredictable. Algorithmic stablecoins enabled by blockchain technology are promising in solving this problem. Algorithmic stablecoins…
We introduce a novel characterization of all Walrasian price vectors in terms of forbidden over- and under demanded sets for monotone gross substitute combinatorial auctions. For ascending and descending auctions we suggest a universal…
Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are essential to decentralized finance, offering continuous liquidity and enabling intermediary-free trading on blockchains. However, participants in AMMs are vulnerable to Maximal Extractable Value (MEV)…
Trading large volumes of a financial asset in order driven markets requires the use of algorithmic execution dividing the volume in many transactions in order to minimize costs due to market impact. A proper design of an optimal execution…
Blockchains are widely used for secure transaction processing, but their scalability remains limited, and existing multichain designs are typically static even as demand and capacity shift. We cast blockchain configuration as a multiagent…
We study a model of auction design where a seller is selling a set of objects to a set of agents who can be assigned no more than one object. Each agent's preference over (object, payment) pair need not be quasilinear. If the domain…
We study decentralized markets for goods whose utility perishes in time, with compute as a primary motivation. Recent advances in reproducible and verifiable execution allow jobs to pause, verify, and resume across heterogeneous hardware,…
Cloud auctions provide cost-effective strategies for cloud VM allocation. Most existing cloud auctions simply assume that the auctioneer is trustable, and thus the fairness of auctions can be easily achieved. However, in fact, such a…
Walrasian equilibrium prices can be said to coordinate markets: They support a welfare optimal allocation in which each buyer is buying bundle of goods that is individually most preferred. However, this clean story has two caveats. First,…
The constrained consensus problem considered in this paper, denoted interval consensus, is characterized by the fact that each agent can impose a lower and upper bound on the achievable consensus value. Such constraints can be encoded in…
We study an abstract optimal auction problem for a single good or service. This problem includes environments where agents have budgets, risk preferences, or multi-dimensional preferences over several possible configurations of the good…