Related papers: Reduced-Complexity Verification for K-Step and Inf…
In this paper, we investigate both qualitative and quantitative synthesis of optimal privacy-enforcing supervisors for partially-observed discrete-event systems. We consider a dynamic system whose information-flow is partially available to…
In this paper, we investigate a class of information-flow security properties called opacity in partial-observed discrete-event systems. Roughly speaking, a system is said to be opaque if the intruder, which is modeled by a passive…
Opacity has emerged as a central confidentiality notion for information-flow security in discrete event systems (DES), capturing the requirement that an external observer (intruder) should never be able to determine with certainty whether…
Opacity is an important information-flow security property in the analysis of cyber-physical systems. It captures the plausible deniability of the system's secret behavior in the presence of an intruder that may access the information flow.…
Opacity is a confidentiality property that characterizes the non-disclosure of specified secret information of a system to an outside observer. In this paper, we consider the enforcement of opacity within the discrete-event system formalism…
In this paper, we propose several opacity-preserving (bi)simulation relations for general nondeterministic transition systems (NTS) in terms of initial-state opacity, current-state opacity, K-step opacity, and infinite-step opacity. We also…
In this paper, we investigate the enforcement of opacity via supervisory control in the context of discrete-event systems. A system is said to be opaque if the intruder, which is modeled as a passive observer, can never infer confidently…
Finite automata (FAs) model is a popular tool to characterize discrete event systems (DESs) due to its succinctness. However, for some complex systems, it is difficult to describe the necessary details by means of FAs model. In this paper,…
We investigate the enforcement of opacity in discrete-event systems via supervisory control. A system is said to be opaque if a passive intruder can never unambiguously infer whether the system is in a secret state through its observations.…
With the proliferation of communication networks and mobile devices, the privacy and security concerns on their information flow are raised. Given a critical system that may leak confidential information, the problem consists of verifying…
In this paper, we combine the k-reduction map, the moment method, and the classical shadow method into a practical protocol for certifying the entanglement dimensionality. Our approach is based on the observation that a state with…
We introduce a prototype tool strategFTO addressing the verification of a security property in critical software. We consider a recent definition of timed opacity where an attacker aims to deduce some secret while having access only to the…
We delineate a methodology for the specification and verification of flow security properties expressible in the opacity framework. We propose a logic, OpacTL , for straightforwardly expressing such properties in systems that can be…
Opacity is a confidentiality property that holds when certain secret strings of a given system cannot be revealed to an outside observer under any system activity. Opacity violations stimulate the study of opacity enforcement strategies.…
Hyperproperties are system properties that require quantification over multiple execution traces of a system. Hyperproperties can express several specifications of interest for cyber-physical systems--such as opacity, robustness, and…
Classical opacity theory for discrete-event systems relies strictly on observable event sequences, fundamentally failing to capture security breaches in hybrid architectures where an attacker exploits both classical traces and localized…
In discrete-event system control, the worst-case time complexity for computing a system's observer is exponential in the number of that system's states. This results in practical difficulties since some problems require calculating multiple…
As an information-flow privacy property, opacity characterizes whether a malicious external observer (referred to as an intruder) is able to infer the secret behavior of a system. This paper addresses the problem of opacity enforcement…
Opacity and attack detectability are important properties for any system as they allow the states to remain private and malicious attacks to be detected, respectively. In this paper, we show that a fundamental trade-off exists between these…
Opacity is a security property formalizing the information leakage of a system to an external observer, namely intruder. The conventional opacity that has been studied in the Discrete Event System (DES) literature usually assumes passive…