Related papers: Information Design for Congestion Games with Unkno…

The travel costs of the players (travelers) in anonymous congestion games depend on their choices of routes and also on the states of the transportation network such as incidents, weather, and road work. In this extended abstract, we…

Congestion games model a wide variety of real-world resource congestion problems, such as selfish network routing, traffic route guidance in congested areas, taxi fleet optimization and crowd movement in busy areas. However, existing…

A basic lesson from game theory is that strategic behavior often renders the equilibrium outcome inefficient. The recent literature of information design -- a.k.a. signaling or persuasion -- looks to improve equilibria by providing…

This paper studies the monotonicity of equilibrium costs and equilibrium loads in nonatomic congestion games, in response to variations of the demands. The main goal is to identify conditions under which a paradoxical non-monotone behavior…

We study information design in games where players choose from a continuum of actions and have continuously differentiable payoffs. We show that an information structure is optimal when the equilibrium it induces can also be implemented in…

This work considers a novel information design problem and studies how the craft of payoff-relevant environmental signals solely can influence the behaviors of intelligent agents. The agents' strategic interactions are captured by an…

We study routing games in which travelers optimize over routes that are remembered or surfaced, rather than over a fixed exogenous action set. The paper develops a tractable design theory for endogenous recall and then connects it back to…

A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…

A central question in routing games has been to establish conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium, either in terms of network topology or in terms of costs. This question is well understood in two classes of routing games. The…

In routing games, agents pick their routes through a network to minimize their own delay. A primary concern for the network designer in routing games is the average agent delay at equilibrium. A number of methods to control this average…

Congestion games constitute an important class of non-cooperative games which was introduced by Rosenthal in 1973. In recent years, several extensions of these games were proposed to incorporate aspects that are not captured by the standard…

This study investigates an adaptive pricing scheme aimed at achieving an efficient state in a traffic congestion game characterized by a diverse population of road users. While the planner possesses knowledge of players' preferences, their…

We consider the information design problem in spatial resource competition settings. Agents gather at a location deciding whether to move to another location for possibly higher level of resources, and the utility each agent gets by moving…

Many smart grid frameworks, such as demand response programs, require accurate information about consumers' parameters (e.g., flexibility) at the aggregator side to optimize grid operations. Existing works typically rely on perfect…

We study linear-quadratic games of incomplete information with Gaussian uncertainty, where each player's payoff depends on a privately observed type and a common state. The designer observes the state, elicits types, and sells action…

We propose a generic mechanism for incentivizing behavior in an arbitrary finite game using payments. Doing so is trivial if the mechanism is allowed to observe all actions taken in the game, as this allows it to simply punish those agents…

We consider the problem of coordination via signaling in network congestion games to improve social welfare deteriorated by incomplete information about traffic flow. Traditional studies on signaling, which focus on exogenous factors of…

We study an information design problem for a non-atomic service scheduling game. The service starts at a random time and there is a continuum of agent population who have a prior belief about the service start time but do not observe the…

This paper considers Bayesian persuasion for routing games where information about the uncertain state of the network is provided by a traffic information system (TIS) using public signals. In this setup, the TIS commits to a signalling…

This work considers a novel information design problem and studies how the craft of payoff-relevant environmental signals solely can influence the behaviors of intelligent agents. The agents' strategic interactions are captured by a Markov…