Related papers: Wardrop equilibrium and Braess's paradox for varyi…
The Informational Braess' Paradox (IBP) illustrates a counterintuitive scenario where revelation of additional roadway segments to some self-interested travelers leads to increased travel times for these individuals. IBP extends the…
The classical network configuration introduced by Braess in 1968 is of fundamental significance because Valiant and Roughgarden showed in 2006 that `the "global" behaviour of an equilibrium flow in a large random network is similar to that…
We consider network models where information items flow %are sent from a source to a sink node. We start with a model where routing is constrained by energy available on nodes in finite supply (like in Smartdust) and efficiency is related…
The inefficiency of the Wardrop equilibrium of nonatomic routing games can be eliminated by placing tolls on the edges of a network so that the socially optimal flow is induced as an equilibrium flow. A solution where the minimum number of…
We consider the traffic assignment problem in nonatomic routing games where the players' cost functions may be subject to random fluctuations (e.g., weather disturbances, perturbations in the underlying network, etc.). We tackle this…
The co-evolution between network structure and functional performance is a fundamental and challenging problem whose complexity emerges from the intrinsic interdependent nature of structure and function. Within this context, we investigate…
A Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) is formulated to capture the relationships between multiple Mobility Service Providers (MSPs) and the users of a multi-modal transport network. The network supply structure is…
A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…
We study a network formation game where nodes wish to send traffic to other nodes. Nodes can contract bilaterally other nodes to form bidirectional links as well as nodes can break unilaterally contracts to eliminate the corresponding…
In this paper we propose a dynamic Stackelberg game-theoretic model for urban freight transportation planning which is able to characterize the interaction between freight and personal transportation in an urban area. The problem is…
We initiate the study of congestion games with variable demands where the (variable) demand has to be assigned to exactly one subset of resources. The players' incentives to use higher demands are stimulated by non-decreasing and concave…
We investigate the dynamics of Q-learning in a class of generalized Braess paradox games. These games represent an important class of network routing games where the associated stage-game Nash equilibria do not constitute social optima. We…
The Parrondo's paradox is a counterintuitive phenomenon in which individually losing strategies, canonically termed game A and game B, are combined to produce winning outcomes. In this paper, a co-evolution of game dynamics and network…
We consider a largely untapped potential for the improvement of traffic networks that is rooted in the inherent uncertainty of travel times. Travel times are subject to stochastic uncertainty resulting from various parameters such as…
In routing games, agents pick their routes through a network to minimize their own delay. A primary concern for the network designer in routing games is the average agent delay at equilibrium. A number of methods to control this average…
We study a novel approach to information design in the standard traffic model of network congestion games. It captures the natural condition that the demand is unknown to the users of the network. A principal (e.g., a mobility service)…
We consider optimal control of a stochastic network,where service is controlled to prevent buffer overflow. We use a risk-sensitive escape time criterion, which in comparison to the ordinary escape time criteria heavily penalizes exits…
How is efficiency affected when demand excesses over supply are signalled through waiting in queues? We consider a class of congestion games with a nonatomic set of players of a constant mass, based on a formulation of generic linear…
We consider multi-player games played on graphs, in which the players aim at fulfilling their own (not necessarily antagonistic) objectives. In the spirit of evolutionary game theory, we suppose that the players have the right to repeatedly…
We show that computing an equilibrium in atomic splittable congestion games with player-specific affine cost functions $l_{e,i}(x) = a_{e,i} x + b_{e,i}$ is $\mathsf{PPAD}$-complete. To prove that the problem is contained in…