Related papers: Wardrop equilibrium and Braess's paradox for varyi…
We discuss the connection between a class of distributed quantum games, with remotely located players, to the counter intuitive Braess' paradox of traffic flow that is an important design consideration in generic networks where the addition…
Stability of Wardrop equilibria is analyzed for dynamical transportation networks in which the drivers' route choices are influenced by information at multiple temporal and spatial scales. The considered model involves a continuum of…
In routing games, the network performance at equilibrium can be significantly improved if we remove some edges from the network. This counterintuitive fact, widely known as Braess's paradox, gives rise to the (selfish) network design…
The Braess's Paradox (BP) is the observation that adding one or more roads to the existing road network will counter-intuitively increase traffic congestion and slow down the overall traffic flow. Previously, the existence of the BP is…
To systematically study the implications of additional information about routes provided to certain users (e.g., via GPS-based route guidance systems), we introduce a new class of congestion games in which users have differing information…
Wardrop equilibria in nonatomic congestion games are in general inefficient as they do not induce an optimal flow that minimizes the total travel time. Network tolls are a prominent and popular way to induce an optimum flow in equilibrium.…
The Braess paradox can be observed in road networks used by selfish users. It describes the counterintuitive situation in which adding a new, per se faster, origin-destination connection to a road network results in increased travel times…
The price of anarchy has become a standard measure of the efficiency of equilibria in games. Most of the literature in this area has focused on establishing worst-case bounds for specific classes of games, such as routing games or more…
The Braess paradox is a counter-intuitive phenomenon whereby adding roads to a network results in higher travel time at equilibrium. In this paper we present an algorithm to detect the occurrence of this paradox in real-world networks with…
As one of the most fundamental concepts in transportation science, Wardrop equilibrium (WE) has always had a relatively weak behavioral underpinning. To strengthen this foundation, one must reckon with bounded rationality in human…
The well-known Braess paradox in congestion games states that adding an additional road to a transportation network may increase the total travel time, and consequently decrease the overall efficiency. Motivated by this, this paper presents…
The paper studies the routing in the network shared by several users. Each user seeks to optimize either its own performance or some combination between its own performance and that of other users, by controlling the routing of its given…
A central question in routing games has been to establish conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium, either in terms of network topology or in terms of costs. This question is well understood in two classes of routing games. The…
We seek to understand when heterogeneity in user preferences yields improved outcomes in terms of overall cost. That this might be hoped for is based on the common belief that diversity is advantageous in many settings. We investigate this…
We consider the behavior of the price of anarchy and equilibrium flows in nonatomic multi-commodity routing games as a function of the traffic demand. We analyze their smoothness with a special attention to specific values of the demand at…
In this paper we propose a LWR-like model for traffic flow on networks which allows one to track several groups of drivers, each of them being characterized only by their destination in the network. The path actually followed to reach the…
We study the Braess paradox in the transport network as originally proposed by Braess with totally asymmetric exclusion processes (TASEPs) on the edges. The Braess paradox describes the counterintuitive situation in which adding an edge to…
Markovian network equilibrium generalizes the classical Wardrop equilibrium in network games. At a Markovian network equilibrium, each player of the game solves a Markov decision process instead of a shortest path problem. We propose two…
We study the properties of Braess's paradox in the context of the model of congestion games with flow over time introduced by Koch and Skutella. We compare them to the well known properties of Braess's paradox for Wardrop's model of games…
We consider a discrete-time nonatomic routing game with variable demand and uncertain costs. Given a routing network with single origin and destination, the cost function of each edge depends on some uncertain persistent state parameter. At…