Related papers: Nash Welfare and Facility Location
In this paper, we investigate the Mechanism Design aspects of the $m$-Capacitated Facility Location Problem ($m$-CFLP) on a line. We focus on two frameworks. In the first framework, the number of facilities is arbitrary, all facilities have…
Fair clustering has traditionally focused on ensuring equitable group representation or equalizing group-specific clustering costs. However, Dickerson et al. (2025) recently showed that these fairness notions may yield undesirable or…
How does one allocate a collection of resources to a set of strategic agents in a fair and efficient manner without using money? For in many scenarios it is not feasible to use money to compensate agents for otherwise unsatisfactory…
Mechanism design in resource allocation studies dividing limited resources among self-interested agents whose satisfaction with the allocation depends on privately held utilities. We consider the problem in a payment-free setting, with the…
In \emph{bandwidth allocation games} (BAGs), the strategy of a player consists of various demands on different resources. The player's utility is at most the sum of these demands, provided they are fully satisfied. Every resource has a…
This paper studies the problem of minimizing group-level inequity in facility location games on the real line, where agents belong to different groups and may act strategically. We explore a fairness-oriented objective that minimizes the…
We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of strategic agents with additive valuation functions. We assume no monetary transfers and, therefore, a mechanism in our setting is an algorithm that takes as…
We consider non-cooperative facility location games where both facilities and clients act strategically and heavily influence each other. This contrasts established game-theoretic facility location models with non-strategic clients that…
Fair facility location problems try to balance access costs to open facilities borne by different groups of people by minimizing the $L_p$ norm of these group distances. However, there is no clear choice of "$p$" in the current literature.…
We consider a new setting of facility location games with ordinal preferences. In such a setting, we have a set of agents and a set of facilities. Each agent is located on a line and has an ordinal preference over the facilities. Our goal…
We suggest a novel stochastic-approximation algorithm to compute a symmetric Nash-equilibrium strategy in a general queueing game with a finite action space. The algorithm involves a single simulation of the queueing process with dynamic…
Network slicing to enable resource sharing among multiple tenants --network operators and/or services-- is considered a key functionality for next generation mobile networks. This paper provides an analysis of a well-known model for…
In many applications such as rationing medical care and supplies, university admissions, and the assignment of public housing, the decision of who receives an allocation can be justified by various normative criteria. Such settings have…
We consider item allocation to individual agents who have additive valuations, in settings in which there are protected groups, and the allocation needs to give each protected group its "fair" share of the total welfare. Informally, within…
We investigate both stationary and time-varying, nonmonotone generalized Nash equilibrium problems that exhibit symmetric interactions among the agents, which are known to be potential. As may happen in practical cases, however, we envision…
In many situations, several agents need to make a sequence of decisions. For example, a group of workers that needs to decide where their weekly meeting should take place. In such situations, a decision-making mechanism must consider…
We consider a truthful facility location problem with agents that have private positions on the line of real numbers and known optional preferences over two obnoxious facilities that must be placed at locations chosen from a given set of…
We consider a problem where agents have private positions on a line, and public approval preferences over two facilities, and their cost is the maximum distance from their approved facilities. The goal is to decide the facility locations to…
This paper studies algorithmic decision-making in the presence of strategic individual behaviors, where an ML model is used to make decisions about human agents and the latter can adapt their behavior strategically to improve their future…
We consider the platoon matching problem for a set of trucks with the same origin, but different destinations. It is assumed that the vehicles benefit from traveling in a platoon for instance through reduced fuel consumption. The vehicles…