Related papers: No Forking Way: Detecting Cloning Attacks on Intel…
The cloud computing landscape has evolved significantly in recent years, embracing various sandboxes to meet the diverse demands of modern cloud applications. These sandboxes encompass container-based technologies like Docker and gVisor,…
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), such as Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX), are considered as a promising approach to resolve security challenges in clouds. TEEs protect the confidentiality and integrity of application code and…
Intel's software guard extensions (SGX) provide hardware enclaves to guarantee confidentiality and integrity for sensitive code and data. However, systems leveraging such security mechanisms must often pay high performance overheads. A…
Intel(r) Software Guard Extensions (SGX) was originally released on client platforms and later extended to single socket server platforms. As developers have become familiar with the capabilities of the technology, the applicability of this…
Trusted execution environments (TEEs) protect the integrity and confidentiality of running code and its associated data. Nevertheless, TEEs' integrity protection does not extend to the state saved on disk. Furthermore, modern cloud-native…
Our objective is to protect the integrity and confidentiality of applications operating in untrusted environments. Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are not a panacea. Hardware TEEs fail to protect applications against Sybil, Fork and…
A trusted execution environment (TEE) such as Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX) runs a remote attestation to prove to a data owner the integrity of the initial state of an enclave, including the program to operate on her data. For this…
Intel SGX and hypervisors isolate non-privileged programs from other software, ensuring confidentiality and integrity. However, side-channel attacks continue to threaten Intel SGX's security, enabling malicious OS to manipulate PTE present…
Applications running in Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) commonly use untrusted external services such as host File System. Adversaries may maliciously alter the normal service behavior to trigger subtle application bugs that would…
Content-based routing (CBR) is a powerful model that supports scalable asynchronous communication among large sets of geographically distributed nodes. Yet, preserving privacy represents a major limitation for the wide adoption of CBR,…
To mitigate interrupt-based stepping attacks (notably using SGX-Step), Intel introduced AEX-Notify, an ISA extension to Intel SGX that aims to prevent deterministic single-stepping. In this work, we introduce AEX-NStep, the first interrupt…
Code clones are similar code fragments that often arise from copy-and-paste programming. Neural networks can classify pairs of code fragments as clone/not-clone with high accuracy. However, finding clones in industrial-scale code needs a…
An increasing number of distributed platforms combine Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) with blockchains. Indeed, many hail the combination of TEEs and blockchains a good "marriage": TEEs bring confidential computing to the blockchain…
Nowadays, in operating systems, numerous protection mechanisms prevent or limit the user-mode applicationsto access the kernels internal information. This is regularlycarried out by software-based defenses such as Address Space Layout…
The rapidly expanding nature of the Internet of Things (IoT) networks is beginning to attract interest across a range of applications, including smart homes, smart transportation, smart health, and industrial contexts. This cutting-edge…
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) have emerged at the forefront of edge computing to combat the lack of trust between system components. Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are commonly used as edge computers but were not created…
Protected-module architectures (PMAs) have been proposed to provide strong isolation guarantees, even on top of a compromised system. Unfortunately, Intel SGX -- the only publicly available high-end PMA -- has been shown to only provide…
Side-channel information leakage is a known limitation of SGX. Researchers have demonstrated that secret-dependent information can be extracted from enclave execution through page-fault access patterns. Consequently, various recent research…
New types of Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) architectures like TrustLite and Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) are emerging. They bring new features that can lead to innovative security and privacy solutions. But each new TEE…
Identifying recurring vulnerabilities is crucial for ensuring software security. Clone-based techniques, while widely used, often generate many false alarms due to the existence of similar but patched (SBP) code, which is similar to…