Related papers: Strategies Resilient to Delay: Games under Delayed…
This paper presents a characterization of distributed controllers subject to delay constraints induced by a strongly connected communication graph that achieve a prescribed closed loop $\mathcal{H}_\infty$ norm. Inspired by the solution to…
We study a class of infinite-horizon impulse control problems with execution delay in discrete time. Using probabilistic methods, particularly the notion of the Snell envelope of processes, we construct an optimal strategy among all…
In this paper, we examine the convergence landscape of multi-agent learning under uncertainty. Specifically, we analyze two stochastic models of regularized learning in continuous games -- one in continuous and one in discrete time with the…
Something is definitely wrong. If the game has a linear winning strategy, then it is tractable. What's going on? Well, we describe a two-person game which has a definite winner, that is, a player who can force a win in a finite number of…
We consider a dynamical approach to sequential games. By restricting the convertibility relation over strategy profiles, we obtain a semi-potential (in the sense of Kukushkin), and we show that in finite games the corresponding restriction…
We investigate the transient times for the onset of control of steady states by time-delayed feedback. The optimization of control by minimising the transient time before control becomes effective is discussed analytically and numerically,…
Artificial agents are typically oriented to the realization of an externally assigned task and try to optimize over secondary aspects of plan execution such time lapse or power consumption, technically displaying a quasi-dichotomous…
We introduce a new class of context dependent, incomplete information games to serve as structured prediction models for settings with significant strategic interactions. Our games map the input context to outcomes by first condensing the…
We investigate the dynamics of an array of logistic maps coupled with random delay times. We report that for adequate coupling strength the array is able to synchronize, in spite of the random delays. Specifically, we find that the…
We exhibit optimal control strategies for a simple toy problem in which the underlying dynamics depend on a parameter that is initially unknown and must be learned. We consider a cost function posed over a finite time interval, in contrast…
Consider planning a trip in a train network. In contrast to, say, a road network, the edges are temporal, i.e., they are only available at certain times. Another important difficulty is that trains, unfortunately, sometimes get delayed.…
This paper investigates online distributed aggregative games with time-varying cost functions, where agents are interconnected through an unbalanced communication graph. Due to the distributed and noncooperative nature of the game, some…
Recently, in [K.R. Apt and S. Simon: Well-founded extensive games with perfect information, TARK21], we studied well-founded games, a natural extension of finite extensive games with perfect information in which all plays are finite. We…
Infinitely repeated games can support cooperative outcomes that are not equilibria in the one-shot game. The idea is to make sure that any gains from deviating will be offset by retaliation in future rounds. However, this model of…
We investigate multi-round team competitions between two teams, where each team selects one of its players simultaneously in each round and each player can play at most once. The competition defines an extensive-form game with perfect…
Candogan et al. (2011) provide an orthogonal direct-sum decomposition of finite games into potential, harmonic and nonstrategic components. In this paper we study the issue of decomposing games that are strategically equivalent from a…
It is well-known that for infinitely repeated games, there are computable strategies that have best responses, but no computable best responses. These results were originally proved for either specific games (e.g., Prisoner's dilemma), or…
In multi-agent settings, game theory is a natural framework for describing the strategic interactions of agents whose objectives depend upon one another's behavior. Trajectory games capture these complex effects by design. In competitive…
Game theory is the standard tool used to model strategic interactions in evolutionary biology and social science. Traditional game theory studies the equilibria of simple games. But is traditional game theory applicable if the game is…
We study the conditions under which the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies is order independent and we identify a class of discontinuous games for which order does not matter. In this way, we answer the open problem…