Related papers: Constant Approximation for Private Interdependent …
The present study introduce the human capital component to the Fama and French five-factor model proposing an equilibrium six-factor asset pricing model. The study employs an aggregate of four sets of portfolios mimicking size and industry…
We consider interactive learning and covering problems, in a setting where actions may incur different costs, depending on the response to the action. We propose a natural greedy algorithm for response-dependent costs. We bound the…
Selling a single item to $n$ self-interested buyers is a fundamental problem in economics, where the two objectives typically considered are welfare maximization and revenue maximization. Since the optimal mechanisms are often impractical…
The design of the best economic mechanism for Sponsored Search Auctions (SSAs) is a central task in computational mechanism design/game theory. Two open questions concern the adoption of user models more accurate than that one currently…
A seller chooses a reserve price in a second-price auction to maximize worst-case expected revenue when she knows only the mean of value distribution and an upper bound on either values themselves or variance. Values are private and iid.…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among $n$ agents with the objective of maximizing Nash social welfare (NSW). This welfare function is defined as the geometric mean of the agents' valuations and, hence, it strikes a…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among agents which are equipped with {\em leveled} valuation functions. Such preferences, that have been studied before in economics and fair division literature, capture a simple…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents that have an identical subadditive valuation over the goods. The extent of fairness and efficiency of allocations is measured by the generalized means of the values that the…
In contextual dynamic pricing, a seller sequentially prices goods based on contextual information. Buyers will purchase products only if the prices are below their valuations. The goal of the seller is to design a pricing strategy that…
The stochastic approximation EM algorithm (SAEM) is described for the estimation of item and person parameters given test data coded as dichotomous or ordinal variables. The method hinges upon the eigenanalysis of missing variables sampled…
We consider the problem of guaranteeing maximin-share (MMS) when allocating a set of indivisible items to a set of agents with fractionally subadditive (XOS) valuations. For XOS valuations, it has been previously shown that for some…
In this paper, we take a mechanism design approach to optimal assignment problems with asymmetrically informed buyers. In addition, the surplus generated by an assignment of a buyer to a seller may be adversely affected by externalities…
This paper develops a general approach, rooted in statistical learning theory, to learning an approximately revenue-maximizing auction from data. We introduce $t$-level auctions to interpolate between simple auctions, such as welfare…
Auctions have been proposed as a way to provide economic incentives for primary users to dynamically allocate unused spectrum to other users in need of it. Previously proposed schemes do not take into account the fact that the power…
Submodular maximization is a classic algorithmic problem with multiple applications in data mining and machine learning; there, the growing need to deal with massive instances motivates the design of algorithms balancing the quality of the…
We study the problem of maximizing Nash social welfare, which is the geometric mean of agents' utilities, in two well-known models. The first model involves one-sided preferences, where a set of indivisible items is allocated among a group…
Maximizing a single submodular set function subject to a cardinality constraint is a well-studied and central topic in combinatorial optimization. However, finding a set that maximizes multiple functions at the same time is much less…
We establish nonparametric identification of auction models with continuous and nonseparable unobserved heterogeneity using three consecutive order statistics of bids. We then propose sieve maximum likelihood estimators for the joint…
We study the mechanism design problem of selling $k$ items to unit-demand buyers with private valuations for the items. A buyer either participates directly in the auction or is represented by an intermediary, who represents a subset of…
We consider a monopolist seller with $n$ heterogeneous items, facing a single buyer. The buyer has a value for each item drawn independently according to (non-identical) distributions, and her value for a set of items is additive. The…