Related papers: Constant Approximation for Private Interdependent …
Market-based mechanisms such as auctions are being studied as an appropriate means for resource allocation in distributed and mulitagent decision problems. When agents value resources in combination rather than in isolation, they must often…
In online combinatorial allocations/auctions, n bidders sequentially arrive, each with a combinatorial valuation (such as submodular/XOS) over subsets of m indivisible items. The aim is to immediately allocate a subset of the remaining…
Consider the seller's problem of finding optimal prices for her $n$ (divisible) goods when faced with a set of $m$ consumers, given that she can only observe their purchased bundles at posted prices, i.e., revealed preferences. We study…
In budget-feasible mechanism design, there is a set of items $U$, each owned by a distinct seller. The seller of item $e$ incurs a private cost $\overline{c}_e$ for supplying her item. A buyer wishes to procure a set of items from the…
We present a $380$-approximation algorithm for the Nash Social Welfare problem with submodular valuations. Our algorithm builds on and extends a recent constant-factor approximation for Rado valuations.
We construct prior-free auctions with constant-factor approximation guarantees with ordered bidders, in both unlimited and limited supply settings. We compare the expected revenue of our auctions on a bid vector to the monotone price…
We consider the fundamental problem of selecting $k$ out of $n$ random variables in a way that the expected highest or second-highest value is maximized. This question captures several applications where we have uncertainty about the…
We study truthful mechanisms for approximating the Maximin-Share (MMS) allocation of agents with additive valuations for indivisible goods. Algorithmically, constant factor approximations exist for the problem for any number of agents. When…
We study combinatorial auctions where each item is sold separately but simultaneously via a second price auction. We ask whether it is possible to efficiently compute in this game a pure Nash equilibrium with social welfare close to the…
Complements between goods - where one good takes on added value in the presence of another - have been a thorn in the side of algorithmic mechanism designers. On the one hand, complements are common in the standard motivating applications…
We consider a class of generalized capital asset pricing models in continuous time with a finite number of agents and tradable securities. The securities may not be sufficient to span all sources of uncertainty. If the agents have…
We study the problem of fair allocation of indivisible goods for subadditive agents. While constant-\textsf{MMS} bounds have been given for additive and fractionally subadditive agents, the best existential bound for the case of subadditive…
In this paper, we revisit the problem of approximating a pacing equilibrium in second-price auctions, introduced by Conitzer, Kroer, Sodomka, and Moses [Oper. Res. 2022]. We show that finding a constant-factor approximation of a pacing…
In most of microeconomic theory, consumers are assumed to exhibit decreasing marginal utilities. This paper considers combinatorial auctions among such submodular buyers. The valuations of such buyers are placed within a hierarchy of…
We study the problem of selection in the context of Bayesian persuasion. We are given multiple agents with hidden values (or quality scores), to whom resources must be allocated by a welfare-maximizing decision-maker. An intermediary with…
We study autobidding ad auctions with user costs, where each bidder is value-maximizing subject to a return-over-investment (ROI) constraint, and the seller aims to maximize the social welfare taking into consideration the user's cost of…
The stability of statistical analysis is an important indicator for reproducibility, which is one main principle of scientific method. It entails that similar statistical conclusions can be reached based on independent samples from the same…
A continuous approximation for the results of [1] is obtained. In this approximation the energy distribution is represented in the form of the product of the Gibbs factor and superstatistics factor. The mutual weights of the factors are…
For selling a single item to agents with independent but non-identically distributed values, the revenue optimal auction is complex. With respect to it, Hartline and Roughgarden (2009) showed that the approximation factor of the…
We discuss the foundations of factor or regression models in the light of the self-consistency condition that the market portfolio (and more generally the risk factors) is (are) constituted of the assets whose returns it is (they are)…