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MEV attacks have been an omnipresent evil in the blockchain world, an implicit tax that uninformed users pay for using the service. The problem arises from the miners' ability to reorder and insert arbitrary transactions in the blocks they…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2022-11-29 Dev Churiwala , Bhaskar Krishnamachari

Blockchains offer strong security gurarantees, but cannot protect users against the ordering of transactions. Players such as miners, bots and validators can reorder various transactions and reap significant profits, called the Maximal…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2023-08-30 Arti Vedula , Shaileshh Bojja Venkatakrishnan , Abhishek Gupta

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) represents a pivotal challenge within the Ethereum ecosystem; it impacts the fairness, security, and efficiency of both Layer 1 (L1) and Layer 2 (L2) networks. MEV arises when miners or validators manipulate…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2025-01-28 Zeinab Alipanahloo , Abdelhakim Senhaji Hafid , Kaiwen Zhang

A central question of the Ethereum ecosystem is where Maximal Extractable Value (MEV)revenue originates and to what extent it stems from harming unsuspecting users. It is acceptable if MEV arises from arbitrages between centralised and…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2026-04-20 Bence Ladóczk , Miklós Rásonyi , János Tapolcai

The asset trading volume on blockchain-based exchanges (DEX) increased substantially since the advent of Automated Market Makers (AMM). Yet, AMMs and their forks compete on the same blockchain, incurring unnecessary network and block-space…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2021-06-21 Liyi Zhou , Kaihua Qin , Arthur Gervais

We analyze maximal extractable value in multiple concurrent proposer blockchains, where multiple blocks become data available before their final execution order is determined. This concurrency breaks the single builder assumption of…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-11-18 Steven Landers , Benjamin Marsh

The evolution of blockchain technology, from its origins as a decentralized ledger for cryptocurrencies to its broader applications in areas like decentralized finance (DeFi), has significantly transformed financial ecosystems while…

Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing · Computer Science 2026-03-04 Daniil Vostrikov , Yash Madhwal , Andrey Seoev , Anastasiia Smirnova , Yury Yanovich , Alexey Smirnov , Vladimir Gorgadze

On high-throughput, low-fee blockchains, a qualitatively new form of maximal extractable value (MEV) has emerged: searchers submit large volumes of speculative transactions, whose profitability is resolved only at execution time. We refer…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2026-04-02 Wenhao Wang , Aditya Saraf , Lioba Heimbach , Kushal Babel , Fan Zhang

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) has garnered significant attention in the cryptocurrency community. Such attention is a consequence of the revenue that can be generated from MEV, as well as the risks MEV poses to the fundamental value…

Information Theory · Computer Science 2023-11-10 Ciaran Hughes

SPEEDEX is a decentralized exchange (DEX) that lets participants securely trade assets without giving any single party undue control over the market. SPEEDEX offers several advantages over prior DEXes. It achieves high throughput -- over…

Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing · Computer Science 2023-03-06 Geoffrey Ramseyer , Ashish Goel , David Mazières

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) searching has gained prominence on the Ethereum blockchain since the surge in Decentralized Finance activities. In Ethereum, MEV extraction primarily hinges on fee payments to block proposers. However, in…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2024-01-17 Burak Öz , Jonas Gebele , Parshant Singh , Filip Rezabek , Florian Matthes

Multi-block MEV (MMEV) denotes the practice of securing k-consecutive blocks in an attempt at extracting surplus value by manipulating transaction ordering. Following the implementation of pro-poser/builder separation (PBS) on Ethereum,…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2023-06-13 Johannes Rude Jensen , Victor von Wachter , Omri Ross

Permissionless blockchains such as Bitcoin have excelled at financial services. Yet, opportunistic traders extract monetary value from the mesh of decentralized finance (DeFi) smart contracts through so-called blockchain extractable value…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2021-12-13 Kaihua Qin , Liyi Zhou , Arthur Gervais

In the context of blockchain, MEV refers to the maximum value that can be extracted from block production through the inclusion, exclusion, or reordering of transactions. Searchers often participate in order flow auctions (OFAs) to obtain…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-02-25 Rasheed , Parth Desai , Yash Chaurasia , Sujit Gujar

Transaction fee mechanism design is a new decentralized mechanism design problem where users bid for space on the blockchain. Several recent works showed that the transaction fee mechanism design fundamentally departs from classical…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2024-04-23 Ke Wu , Elaine Shi , Hao Chung

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) represents billions of dollars in extracted value that fundamentally shapes blockchain network dynamics and participant incentives. While research has focused on MEV extraction and mitigation, we lack…

Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing · Computer Science 2026-05-01 Andrei Seoev , Dmitry Belousov , Anastasiia Smirnova , Ksenia Kurinova , Aleksei Smirnov , Denis Fedyanin , Yury Yanovich

Cyclic arbitrage chances exist abundantly among decentralized exchanges (DEXs), like Uniswap V2. For an arbitrage cycle (loop), researchers or practitioners usually choose a specific token, such as Ether as input, and optimize their input…

Computational Finance · Quantitative Finance 2024-06-25 Yu Zhang , Zichen Li , Tao Yan , Qianyu Liu , Nicolo Vallarano , Claudio Tessone

The successive generations of consensus algorithms have progressively shifted the performance bottleneck of blockchains to the execution layer. While recent works address this by parallelizing transaction execution, they often overlook the…

Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing · Computer Science 2026-04-28 Artjom Pugatsov , Can Umut Ileri , Jérémie Decouchant

Many cryptocurrency platforms are vulnerable to Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) attacks, where a malicious consensus leader can inject transactions or change the order of user transactions to maximize its profit. A promising line of…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2022-12-26 Dahlia Malkhi , Pawel Szalachowski

Maximal Extractable Value, or MEV, remains a structural threat to blockchain fairness because a block producer can often observe pending transactions and unilaterally decide their ordering or inclusion. Existing mitigations hide transaction…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2026-04-10 Jian Sheng Wang