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We consider the problem of designing prices for public transport where payment enforcing is done through random inspection of passengers' tickets as opposed to physically blocking their access. Passengers are fully strategic such that they…

In this work we are concerned with the design of efficient mechanisms while eliciting limited information from the agents. First, we study the performance of sampling approximations in facility location games. Our key result is to show that…

In lowest unique bid auctions, $N$ players bid for an item. The winner is whoever places the \emph{lowest} bid, provided that it is also unique. We use a grand canonical approach to derive an analytical expression for the equilibrium…

In this paper, we develop a new method for finding an optimal biddingstrategy in sequential auctions, using a dynamic programming technique. Theexisting method assumes that the utility of a user is represented in anadditive form. Thus, the…

We consider the problem of the optimization of bidding strategies in prior-dependent revenue-maximizing auctions, when the seller fixes the reserve prices based on the bid distributions. Our study is done in the setting where one bidder is…

Classical optimal auction theory assumes that bids reach the seller directly. We study how this picture changes when a revenue-maximizing intermediary controls access to the seller's auction. Motivated by blockchain auctions, online…

Secondary markets and resale are integral components of all emission trading systems. Despite the justification for these secondary trades, such as unpredictable demand, they may encourage speculation and result in the misallocation of…

We consider a profit maximization problem in an urban mobility on-demand service, of which the operator owns a fleet, provides both exclusive and shared trip services, and dynamically determines prices of offers. With knowledge of the…

This paper considers an electric vehicle charging scheduling setting where vehicle users can reserve charging time in advance at a charging station. In this setting, users are allowed to explicitly express their preferences over different…

Traditional auction theory posits that bid value exhibits a positive correlation with the probability of securing the auctioned object in ascending auctions. However, under uncertainty and incomplete information, as is characteristic in…

Maximizing utility with a budget constraint is the primary goal for advertisers in real-time bidding (RTB) systems. The policy maximizing the utility is referred to as the optimal bidding strategy. Earlier works on optimal bidding strategy…

Simultaneous ascending auctions present agents with the exposure problem: bidding to acquire a bundle risks the possibility of obtaining an undesired subset of the goods. Auction theory provides little guidance for dealing with this…

We study the problem of finding the optimal bidding strategy for an advertiser in a multi-platform auction setting. The competition on a platform is captured by a value and a cost function, mapping bidding strategies to value and cost…

In this paper we study the problem of allocating a scarce resource among several players (or agents). A central decision maker wants to maximize the total utility of all agents. However, such a solution may be unfair for one or more agents…

Internet search companies sell advertisement slots based on users' search queries via an auction. While there has been a lot of attention on the auction process and its game-theoretic aspects, our focus is on the advertisers. In particular,…

I study the design of auctions in which the auctioneer is assumed to have information only about the marginal distribution of a generic bidder's valuation, but does not know the correlation structure of the joint distribution of bidders'…

Flaws of a continuous limit order book mechanism raise the question of whether a continuous trading session and a periodic auction session would bring better efficiency. This paper wants to go further in designing a periodic auction when…

We study a general online combinatorial auction problem in algorithmic mechanism design. A provider allocates multiple types of capacity-limited resources to customers that arrive in a sequential and arbitrary manner. Each customer has a…

One method to offer some bidders a discount in a first-price auction is to augment their bids when selecting a winner but only charge them their original bids should they win. Another method is to use their original bids to select a winner,…

We consider an outsourcing problem where a software agent procures multiple services from providers with uncertain reliabilities to complete a computational task before a strict deadline. The service consumer requires a procurement strategy…