Related papers: Desensitization and Deception in Differential Game…

This paper considers a half-duplex scenario where an interferer behaves according to a parametric model but the values of the model parameters are unknown. We explore the necessary number of sensing steps to gather sufficient knowledge…

Motivated by applications in cyber security, we develop a simple game model for describing how a learning agent's private information influences an observing agent's inference process. The model describes a situation in which one of the…

Learning in multi-player games can model a large variety of practical scenarios, where each player seeks to optimize its own local objective function, which at the same time relies on the actions taken by others. Motivated by the frequent…

Incentive design deals with interaction between a principal and an agent where the former can shape the latter's utility through a policy commitment. It is well known that the principal faces an information rent when dealing with an agent…

Strategic deception is an act of manipulating the opponent's perception to gain strategic advantages. In this paper, we study synthesis of deceptive winning strategies in two-player turn-based zero-sum reachability games on graphs with…

In this paper, we investigate the existence and characterization of the value for a two-player zero-sum differential game with symmetric incomplete information on a continuum of initial positions and with signal revelation. Before the game…

In this work, we study a class of deception planning problems in which an agent aims to alter a security monitoring system's sensor readings so as to disguise its adversarial itinerary as an allowed itinerary in the environment. The…

This article studies rational and persistent deception among intelligent robots to enhance security and operational efficiency. We present an N-player K-stage game with an asymmetric information structure where each robot's private…

Preserving the privacy of preferences (or rewards) of a sequential decision-making agent when decisions are observable is crucial in many physical and cybersecurity domains. For instance, in wildlife monitoring, agents must allocate…

Information asymmetry in games enables players with the information advantage to manipulate others' beliefs by strategically revealing information to other players. This work considers a double-sided information asymmetry in a Bayesian…

Systems operating in adversarial environments may inadvertently leak sensitive information to adversaries. To address this challenge, we revisit the linear-quadratic control framework and introduce deception to actively mislead adversaries.…

LTE/LTE-Advanced networks are known to be vulnerable to denial-of-service and loss-of-service attacks from smart jammers. In this article, the interaction between a smart jammer and LTE network is modeled as an infinite-horizon, zero-sum,…

This work considers two-player zero-sum semi-Markov games with incomplete information on one side and perfect observation. At the beginning, the system selects a game type according to a given probability distribution and informs to Player…

Best-response mechanisms (Nisan, Schapira, Valiant, Zohar, 2011) provide a unifying framework for studying various distributed protocols in which the participants are instructed to repeatedly best respond to each others' strategies. Two…

We introduce games with probabilistic uncertainty, a natural model for controller synthesis in which the controller observes the state of the system through imprecise sensors that provide correct information about the current state with a…

We consider a class of two-player turn-based zero-sum games on graphs with reachability objectives, known as reachability games, where the objective of Player 1 (P1) is to reach a set of goal states, and that of Player 2 (P2) is to prevent…

Deception plays a key role in adversarial or strategic interactions for the purpose of self-defence and survival. This paper introduces a general framework and solution to address deception. Most existing approaches for deception consider…

We consider surveillance-evasion differential games, where a pursuer must try to constantly maintain visibility of a moving evader. The pursuer loses as soon as the evader becomes occluded. Optimal controls for game can be formulated as a…

We study the problem of implementing equilibria of complete information games in settings of incomplete information, and address this problem using "recommender mechanisms." A recommender mechanism is one that does not have the power to…

This paper considers a zero-sum two-player asymmetric information stochastic game where only one player knows the system state, and the transition law is controlled by the informed player only. For the informed player, it has been shown…