Related papers: Concave many-to-one matching

In a many-to-many matching model in which agents' preferences satisfy substitutability and the law of aggregate demand, we present an algorithm to compute the full set of stable matchings. This algorithm relies on the idea of "cycles in…

We study the existence of stable matchings when agents have choice correspondences instead of preference relations. We extend the framework of \cite{chambers2017choice} by weakening the path independence assumption. For many-to-many…

In this paper, we consider one-to-one matchings between two disjoint groups of agents. Each agent has a preference over a subset of the agents in the other group, and these preferences may contain ties. Strong stability is one of the…

We introduce Contested Logistics Games, a variant of logistics problems that account for the presence of an adversary that can disrupt the movement of goods in selected areas. We model this as a large two-player zero-sum one-shot game…

In a stable matching setting, we consider a query model that allows for an interactive learning algorithm to make precisely one type of query: proposing a matching, the response to which is either that the proposed matching is stable, or a…

In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in matching frictions, as arising in the labor market for…

We study existence, uniqueness and computability of solutions for a class of discrete time recursive utilities models. By combining two streams of the recent literature on recursive preferences---one that analyzes principal eigenvalues of…

Roommate problems with convex preferences always have stable matchings. Efficiency and individual rationality are, moreover, compatible with strategyproofness in such convex roommate problems. Both of these results fail without the…

Markov games with coupling constraints model constrained dynamical decision-making involving self-interested agents, where the feasibility of an individual agent's strategy depends on the joint strategies of the others. Such games arise in…

In this paper, we demonstrate that in many NP-complete variants of the stable matching problem, such as the Stable Hypergraph Matching problem, the Stable Multicommodity Flow problem, and the College Admission problem with common quotas, a…

We study a practical centralized matching problem which assigns children to daycare centers. The collective preferences of siblings from the same family introduce complementarities, which can lead to the absence of stable matchings, as…

In this paper, we extend and improve the production chain model introduced by Kikuchi et al. (2018). Utilizing the theory of monotone concave operators, we prove the existence, uniqueness, and global stability of equilibrium price, hence…

For a many-to-one market where firms are endowed with path-independent choice functions, based on the Aizerman-Malishevski decomposition, we define an associated one-to-one market. Given that the usual notion of stability for a one-to-one…

Many-to-one matching markets exist in numerous different forms, such as college admissions, matching medical interns to hospitals for residencies, assigning housing to college students, and the classic firms and workers market. In all these…

There are growing concerns that algorithms, which increasingly make or influence important decisions pertaining to individuals, might produce outcomes that discriminate against protected groups. We study such fairness concerns in the…

We study two-sided matching markets in which one side of the market (the players) does not have a priori knowledge about its preferences for the other side (the arms) and is required to learn its preferences from experience. Also, we assume…

We introduce notions of concavity for functions on balanced polyhedral spaces, and we show that concave functions on such spaces satisfy several strong continuity properties.

The stable matching problem is a prototype model in economics and social sciences where agents act selfishly to optimize their own satisfaction, subject to mutually conflicting constraints. A stable matching is a pairing of adjacent…

We study many-to-one matching problems between institutions and individuals, where each institution may be matched to multiple individuals. The matching market includes couples, who view pairs of institutions as complementary. Institutions'…

We show how fragile stable matchings are in a decentralized one-to-one matching setting. The classical work of Roth and Vande Vate (1990) suggests simple decentralized dynamics in which randomly-chosen blocking pairs match successively.…