Related papers: Regret-Minimizing Project Choice
We prove an existence result for the principal-agent problem with adverse selection under general assumptions on preferences and allocation spaces. Instead of assuming that the allocation space is finite-dimensional or compact, we consider…
In this paper, we study the collaborative learning model, which concerns the tradeoff between parallelism and communication overhead in multi-agent multi-armed bandits. For regret minimization in multi-armed bandits, we present the first…
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that…
In the classical principal-agent hidden-action contract model, a principal delegates the execution of a costly task to an agent. In order to complete the task, the agent chooses an action from a set of actions, where each potential action…
Traditional approaches to the design of multi-agent navigation algorithms consider the environment as a fixed constraint, despite the obvious influence of spatial constraints on agents' performance. Yet hand-designing improved environment…
In this paper, we provide a general framework for studying multi-agent online learning problems in the presence of delays and asynchronicities. Specifically, we propose and analyze a class of adaptive dual averaging schemes in which agents…
We study the role of regulatory inspections in a contract design problem in which a principal interacts separately with multiple agents. Each agent's hidden action includes a dimension that determines whether they undertake an extra costly…
We consider online algorithms under both the competitive ratio criteria and the regret minimization one. Our main goal is to build a unified methodology that would be able to guarantee both criteria simultaneously. For a general class of…
I provide a sufficient condition under which a principal does not benefit from committing to a mechanism in economic models represented by a maximisation problem under constraints. These problems include mechanism design, principal-agent…
This paper studies delegation in a model of discrete choice. In the delegation problem, an uninformed principal must consult an informed agent to make a decision. Both the agent and principal have preferences over the decided-upon action…
Most learning algorithms with formal regret guarantees assume that all mistakes are recoverable and essentially rely on trying all possible behaviors. This approach is problematic when some mistakes are "catastrophic", i.e., irreparable. We…
We consider control in linear time-varying dynamical systems from the perspective of regret minimization. Unlike most prior work in this area, we focus on the problem of designing an online controller which minimizes regret against the best…
Agents that learn to select optimal actions represent a prominent focus of the sequential decision-making literature. In the face of a complex environment or constraints on time and resources, however, aiming to synthesize such an optimal…
We study multi-agent contracts, in which a principal delegates a task to multiple agents and incentivizes them to exert effort. Prior research has mostly focused on maximizing the principal's utility, often resulting in highly disparate…
Motivated by online retail, we consider the problem of selling one item (e.g., an ad slot) to two non-excludable buyers (say, a merchant and a brand). This problem captures, for example, situations where a merchant and a brand cooperatively…
Mechanism design has found considerable application to the construction of agent-interaction protocols. In the standard setting, the type (e.g., utility function) of an agent is not known by other agents, nor is it known by the mechanism…
We consider an agent community wishing to decide on several binary issues by means of issue-by-issue majority voting. For each issue and each agent, one of the two options is better than the other. However, some of the agents may be…
Team formation is ubiquitous in many sectors: education, labor markets, sports, etc. A team's success depends on its members' latent types, which are not directly observable but can be (partially) inferred from past performances. From the…
We introduce a novel model of contracts with combinatorial actions that accounts for sequential and adaptive agent behavior. As in the standard model, a principal delegates the execution of a costly project to an agent. There are $n$…
Companies like Google and Microsoft run billions of auctions every day to sell advertising opportunities. Any change to the rules of these auctions can have a tremendous effect on the revenue of the company and the welfare of the…