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We examine a controlled school choice model where students are categorized into different types, and the distribution of these types within a school influences its priority structure. This study provides a general framework that integrates…
Various models have been recently proposed to reflect and predict different properties of complex networks. However, the community structure, which is one of the most important properties, is not well studied and modeled. In this paper, we…
We study the existence of pairwise stable allocations in matching markets with contracts and propose a domain restriction that guarantees their existence. Specifically, we define pseudo-substitutable preferences, a domain that strictly…
How should authorities that care about match quality and diversity allocate resources when they are uncertain about the market? We introduce adaptive priority mechanisms (APM) that prioritize agents based on both their scores and…
We introduce evolving networks where new vertices preferentially connect to the more central parts of a network. This makes such networks compact. Finite networks grown under the preferential compactness mechanism have complex…
The stable matching problem sets the economic foundation of several practical applications ranging from school choice and medical residency to ridesharing and refugee placement. It is concerned with finding a matching between two disjoint…
Inferring applicant preferences is fundamental in many analyses of school-choice data. Application mistakes make this task challenging. We propose a novel approach to deal with the mistakes in a deferred-acceptance matching environment. The…
Online Resource Allocation addresses the problem of efficiently allocating limited resources to buyers with incomplete knowledge of future requests. In our setting, buyers arrive sequentially requesting a set of items, each with a value…
Randomized experiments have been the gold standard for assessing the effectiveness of a treatment or policy. The classical complete randomization approach assigns treatments based on a prespecified probability and may lead to inefficient…
In this paper, we study a daycare matching problem in Japan and report the design and implementation of a new centralized algorithm, which is going to be deployed in one municipality in the Tokyo metropolis. There are two features that make…
We consider a school choice matching model where the priorities for schools are represented by binary relations that may not be weak order. We focus on the (total order) extensions of the binary relations. We introduce a class of algorithms…
We consider methods for aggregating preferences that are based on the resolution of discrete optimization problems. The preferences are represented by arbitrary binary relations (possibly weighted) or incomplete paired comparison matrices.…
Object counting models suffer when deployed across domains with differing density variety, since density shifts are inherently task-relevant and violate standard domain adaptation assumptions. To address this, we propose a theoretical…
A growing number of authorities use mechanisms to allocate students to schools in a way that reflects student preferences and school priorities. However, most real-world mechanisms incentivize students to strategically misreport their…
Allocation of scarce healthcare resources under limited logistic and infrastructural facilities is a major issue in the modern society. We consider the problem of allocation of healthcare resources like vaccines to people or hospital beds…
Matching problems with group-fairness constraints and diversity constraints have numerous applications such as in allocation problems, committee selection, school choice, etc. Moreover, online matching problems have lots of applications in…
We study variants of the Optimal Refugee Resettlement problem where a set $F$ of refugee families need to be allocated to a set $L$ of possible places of resettlement in a feasible and optimal way. Feasibility issues emerge from the…
In school choice, students make decisions based on their expectations of particular schools' suitability, and the decision to gather information about schools is influenced by the acceptance odds determined by the mechanism in place. We…
The Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm is stable and strategy-proof, but can produce outcomes that are Pareto-inefficient for students, and thus several alternative mechanisms have been proposed to correct this inefficiency. However, we…
Motivated by the shortage of seats that the Chilean school choice system is facing, we introduce the problem of jointly increasing school capacities and finding a student-optimal assignment in the expanded market. Due to the theoretical and…