Related papers: Reputation Effects with Endogenous Records

We consider a model of oligopolistic competition in a market with search frictions, in which competing firms with products of unknown quality advertise how much information a consumer's visit will glean. In the unique symmetric equilibrium…

We present a model for the equilibrium frequency of offenses and the informativeness of witness reports when potential offenders can commit multiple offenses and witnesses are subject to retaliation risk and idiosyncratic reporting…

We study the effects of data sharing between firms on prices, profits, and consumer welfare. Although indiscriminate sharing of consumer data decreases firm profits due to the subsequent increase in competition, selective sharing can be…

This paper studies how the possibility of strategic misreporting shapes endogenous communication networks. Agents observe noisy private signals about a common state, form costly communication links, exchange private messages with their…

The cognitive research on reputation has shown several interesting properties that can improve both the quality of services and the security in distributed electronic environments. In this paper, the impact of reputation on decision-making…

Many markets rely on traders truthfully communicating who has cheated in the past and ostracizing those traders from future trade. This paper investigates when truthful communication is incentive compatible. We find that if each side has a…

We study a rating system in which a set of individuals (e.g., the customers of a restaurant) evaluate a given service (e.g, the restaurant), with their aggregated opinion determining the probability of all individuals to use the service and…

The combination of the Bayesian game and learning has a rich history, with the idea of controlling a single agent in a system composed of multiple agents with unknown behaviors given a set of types, each specifying a possible behavior for…

Advancements in service sector and growing online platforms are intensifying the information exchange between customers through (electronic) word-of-mouth (WoM). The information obtained by WoM has shown to be a dominant factor in…

We study a strategic experimentation game with exponential bandits, in which experiment outcomes are private. The equilibrium amount of experimentation is always higher than in the benchmark case where experiment outcomes are publicly…

We consider a monopoly insurance market with a risk-neutral profit-maximizing insurer and a consumer with Yaari Dual Utility preferences that distort the given continuous loss distribution. The insurer observes the loss distribution but not…

We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information and informational externalities. In these games, two states are chosen at the outset, and players get private information on the pair, before engaging in repeated…

In network formation games, agents form edges with each other to maximize their utility. Each agent's utility depends on its private beliefs and its edges in the network. Strategic agents can misrepresent their beliefs to get a better…

How do inter-organizational networks emerge? Accounting for interdependence among ties while studying tie formation is one of the key challenges in this area of research. We address this challenge using an equilibrium framework where firms'…

In this work we study for the first time the interaction between marketing and network effects. We build a model in which the online firm starts with an initial user base and controls the growth of the user base by choosing the intensity of…

In games with incomplete and ambiguous information, rational behavior depends not only on fundamental ambiguity (ambiguity about states) but also on strategic ambiguity (ambiguity about others' actions), which further induces hierarchies of…

We study how loyalty behavior of customers and differing costs to produce undifferentiated products by firms can influence market outcomes. In prior works that study such markets, firm costs have generally been assumed negligible or equal,…

We study a two-sided online data ecosystem comprised of an online platform, users on the platform, and downstream learners or data buyers. The learners can buy user data on the platform (to run a statistic or machine learning task).…

Each participant in peer-to-peer network prefers to free-ride on the contribution of other participants. Reputation based resource sharing is a way to control the free riding. Instead of classical game theory we use evolutionary game theory…

The problem of efficient sharing of a resource is nearly ubiquitous. Except for pure public goods, each agent's use creates a negative externality; often the negative externality is so strong that efficient sharing is impossible in the…