Related papers: Characterization of Potential Games: Application i…

In many cases the Nash equilibria are not predictive of the experimental players' behaviour. For some games of Game Theory it is proposed here a method to estimate the probabilities with which the different options will be actually chosen…

Cooperative interval games are a generalized model of cooperative games in which the worth of every coalition corresponds to a closed interval representing the possible outcomes of its cooperation. Selections are all possible outcomes of…

This paper coins the notion of Joker games, a variant of concurrent games where the players are not strictly adversarial. Instead, Player 1 can get help from Player 2 by playing a Joker move. We formalize these games as cost games and…

Iterated admissibility is a well-known and important concept in classical game theory, e.g. to determine rational behaviors in multi-player matrix games. As recently shown by Berwanger, this concept can be soundly extended to infinite games…

This paper reframes approachability theory within the context of population games. Thus, whilst one player aims at driving her average payoff to a predefined set, her opponent is not malevolent but rather extracted randomly from a…

As the widely applied method for measuring matching assortativeness in a transferable utility matching game, a matching maximum score estimation is proposed by \cite{fox2010qe}. This article reveals that combining unmatched agents,…

The focus of this essay is a rigorous treatment of infinite games. An infinite game is defined as a play consisting of a fixed number of players whose sequence of moves is repeated, or iterated ad infinitum. Each sequence corresponds to a…

Without further ado, we present the P_3-game. The P_3-game is decidable for elementary classes of graphs such as paths and cycles. From an algorithmic point of view, the connected P_3-game is fascinating. We show that the connected P_3-game…

We study a simple adaptive model in the framework of an N -player normal form game. The model consists of a repeated game where the players only know their own action space and their own payoff scored at each stage, not those of the other…

We construct a statistical ensemble of games, where in each independent subensemble we have two players playing the same game. We derive the mean payoffs per move of the representative players of the game, and we evaluate all the…

In multiplayer games with sequential decision-making, self-interested players form dynamic coalitions to achieve most-preferred temporal goals beyond their individual capabilities. We introduce a novel procedure to synthesize strategies…

In an iterated game between two players, there is much interest in characterizing the set of feasible payoffs for both players when one player uses a fixed strategy and the other player is free to switch. Such characterizations have led to…

We introduce a class of financial contracts involving several parties by extending the notion of a two-person game option (see Kifer (2000)) to a contract in which an arbitrary number of parties is involved and each of them is allowed to…

We consider two-player zero-sum games on graphs. These games can be classified on the basis of the information of the players and on the mode of interaction between them. On the basis of information the classification is as follows: (a)…

Enormous successes have been made by quantum algorithms during the last decade. In this paper, we combine the quantum game with the problem of data clustering, and then develop a quantum-game-based clustering algorithm, in which data points…

We recently introduced p-automata, automata that read discrete-time Markov chains. We used turn-based stochastic parity games to define acceptance of Markov chains by a subclass of p-automata. Definition of acceptance required a cumbersome…

In this expository article, we give an overview of the concept of potential mean field games of first order. We give a new proof that minimizers of the potential are equilibria by using a Lagrangian formulation. We also provide criteria to…

In this paper, we introduce past-aware game-theoretic centrality, a class of centrality measures that captures the collaborative contribution of nodes in a network, accounting for both uncertain and certain collaborators. A general…

In communication systems where users share common resources, users' selfish behavior usually results in suboptimal resource utilization. There have been extensive works that model communication systems with selfish users as one-shot games…

Compositional Game Theory is a new, recently introduced model of economic games based upon the computer science idea of compositionality. In it, complex and irregular games can be built up from smaller and simpler games, and the equilibria…