Related papers: Procurement in welfare programs: Evidence and impl…
This paper studies one emerging procurement auction scenario where the market is constructed over the social networks. In a social network composed of many agents, smartphones or computers, one requester releases her requirement for goods…
The system operator's scheduling problem in electricity markets, called unit commitment, is a non-convex mixed-integer program. The optimal value function is non-convex, preventing the application of traditional marginal pricing theory to…
We present a model of digital advertising with three key features: (i) advertisers can reach consumers on and off a platform, (ii) additional data enhances the value of advertiser-consumer matches, and (iii) bidding follows auction-like…
Combinatorial Auctions are a central problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design: pricing and allocating goods to buyers with complex preferences in order to maximize some desired objective (e.g., social welfare, revenue, or profit). The…
The goal of an auction is to determine commodity prices such that all participants are perfectly happy. Such a solution is called a competitive equilibrium and does not exist in general. For this reason we are interested in solutions which…
As the scale of machine learning models increases, trends such as scaling laws anticipate consistent downstream improvements in predictive accuracy. However, these trends take the perspective of a single model-provider in isolation, while…
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of welfare measures when oligopolistic firms face multiple policy interventions and external changes under general forms of market demands, production costs, and imperfect competition. We present…
In the allocation of resources to a set of agents, how do fairness guarantees impact the social welfare? A quantitative measure of this impact is the price of fairness, which measures the worst-case loss of social welfare due to fairness…
We study statistical parameter estimation in the setting of data markets. A buyer seeks to estimate a parameter based on samples that can be purchased from competing providers that differ in their data quality and provision costs. When…
This paper aims to investigate how a central authority (e.g. a government) can increase social welfare in a network of markets and firms. In these networks, modeled using a bipartite graph, firms compete with each other \textit{\`a la}…
This study constructs a novel analytical general equilibrium model to compare environmental policies in a setting where oligopolistic energy firms engage in third-degree price discrimination across residential consumers and industrial…
We study the aggregate welfare and individual regret guarantees of dynamic \emph{pacing algorithms} in the context of repeated auctions with budgets. Such algorithms are commonly used as bidding agents in Internet advertising platforms,…
In this paper, we propose a general operating scheme which allows the utility company to jointly perform power procurement and demand response so as to maximize the social welfare. Our model takes into consideration the effect of the…
Spectrum auctions are the primary mechanism through which governments allocate scarce radio frequencies, with outcomes that shape competition, coverage, and innovation in telecommunications markets. While traditional models of spectrum…
We study the problem of a seller dynamically pricing $d$ distinct types of indivisible goods, when faced with the online arrival of unit-demand buyers drawn independently from an unknown distribution. The goods are not in limited supply,…
We study the allocation of divisible goods to competing agents via a market mechanism, focusing on agents with Leontief utilities. The majority of the economics and mechanism design literature has focused on \emph{linear} prices, meaning…
We study a combinatorial market design problem, where a collection of indivisible objects is to be priced and sold to potential buyers subject to equilibrium constraints.The classic solution concept for such problems is Walrasian…
We study procurement design when the buyer is uncertain about both the value of the good and the seller's cost. The buyer has a conjectured model but does not fully trust it. She first identifies mechanisms that maximize her worst-case…
Consider a marketplace of AI tools, each with slightly different strengths and weaknesses. By selecting the right model for the task at hand, a user can do better than simply committing to a single model for everything. Routers operate…
Resource distribution is a fundamental problem in economic and policy design, particularly when demand and supply are not naturally aligned. Without regulation, wealthier individuals may monopolize this resource, leaving the needs of others…