Related papers: Supply Function Equilibrium in Networked Electrici…
Large deployment of distribute energy resources and the increasing awareness of end-users towards their energy procurement are challenging current practices of electricity markets. A change of paradigm, from a top-down hierarchical approach…
We consider a market in which capacity-constrained generators compete in scalar-parameterized supply functions to serve an inelastic demand spread throughout a transmission constrained power network. The market clears according to a…
We study the efficiency of allocations in large markets with a network structure where every seller owns an edge in a graph and every buyer desires a path connecting some nodes. While it is known that stable allocations in such settings can…
In this paper, we examine in an abstract framework, how a tradeoff between efficiency and robustness arises in different dynamic oligopolistic market architectures. We consider a market in which there is a monopolistic resource provider and…
Supply chain formation is the process of determining the structure and terms of exchange relationships to enable a multilevel, multiagent production activity. We present a simple model of supply chains, highlighting two characteristic…
We consider a resource allocation problem where individual users wish to send data across a network to maximize their utility, and a cost is incurred at each link that depends on the total rate sent through the link. It is known that as…
In the restructured electricity industry, electricity pooling markets are an oligopoly with strategic producers possessing private information (private production cost function). We focus on pooling markets where aggregate demand is…
With the increased level of distributed generation and demand response comes the need for associated mechanisms that can perform well in the face of increasingly complex deregulated energy market structures. Using Lagrangian duality theory,…
The right performance of a supply chain depends on the pattern of relationships among firms. Although there is not a general consensus among researchers yet, many studies point that scale-free topologies, where few highly related firms are…
In this study, we develop a theoretical model of strategic equilibrium bidding and price-setting behaviour by heterogeneous and boundedly rational electricity producers and a grid operator in a single electricity market under uncertain…
In the restructured electricity industry, electricity pooling markets are an oligopoly with strategic producers possessing private information (private production cost function). We focus on pooling markets where aggregate demand is…
The coordinated operation of interconnected but locally controlled electricity markets is generally referred to as a "coupling". In this paper we propose a new mechanism design for efficient coupling of independent electricity markets. The…
The supply function equilibrium (SFE) is a model for competition in markets where each firm offers a schedule of prices and quantities to face demand uncertainty, and has been successfully applied to wholesale electricity markets. However,…
Motivated by the problem of market power in electricity markets, we introduced in previous works a mechanism for simplified markets of two agents with linear cost. In standard procurement auctions, the market power resulting from the…
This paper investigates the efficiency loss in social cost caused by strategic bidding behavior of individual participants in a supply-demand balancing market, and proposes a mechanism to fully recover equilibrium social optimum via…
This paper studies how platform design shapes strategic behavior in decentralized electricity trading. We develop a finite-horizon dynamic game in which photovoltaic- and battery-equipped players ("prosumers") trade on a platform that maps…
The integration of renewable generation poses operational and economic challenges for the electricity grid. For the core problem of power balance, the legacy paradigm of tailoring supply to follow random demand may be inappropriate under…
Future electricity distribution grids will host a considerable share of the renewable energy sources needed for enforcing the energy transition. Demand side management mechanisms play a key role in the integration of such renewable energy…
Power producers can exhibit strategic behavior in electricity markets to maximize their profits. This behavior is more pronounced with the deregulation of distribution markets, which offers an opportunity for profit arbitrage between…
This paper investigates the effect of network topology on the fair allocation of network resources among a set of agents, an all-important issue for the efficiency of transportation networks all around us. We analyse a generic mechanism…