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Traditional studies of combinatorial auctions often only consider linear constraints (by which the demands for certain goods are limited by the corresponding supplies). The rise of smart grid presents a new class of auctions, characterized…
As computational agents are developed for increasingly complicated e-commerce applications, the complexity of the decisions they face demands advances in artificial intelligence techniques. For example, an agent representing a seller in an…
The goal of this paper is to propose a framework for representing and reasoning about the rules governing a combinatorial exchange. Such a framework is at first interest as long as we want to build up digital marketplaces based on auction,…
With the emerging technologies of Internet of Things (IOTs), the capabilities of mobile devices have increased tremendously. However, in the big data era, to complete tasks on one device is still challenging. As an emerging technology,…
We study algorithms for combinatorial market design problems, where a set of heterogeneous and indivisible objects are priced and sold to potential buyers subject to equilibrium constraints. Extending the CWE notion introduced by Feldman et…
The optimal pricing problem is a fundamental problem that arises in combinatorial auctions. Suppose that there is one seller who has indivisible items and multiple buyers who want to purchase a combination of the items. The seller wants to…
Diffusion auction is a new model in auction design. It can incentivize the buyers who have already joined in the auction to further diffuse the sale information to others via social relations, whereby both the seller's revenue and the…
The Maker Protocol is a decentralized finance application that enables collateralized lending. The application uses open-bid, second-price auctions to complete its loan liquidation process. In this paper, we develop a bidding function for…
Mechanism design for one-sided markets has been investigated for several decades in economics and in computer science. More recently, there has been an increased attention on mechanisms for two-sided markets, in which buyers and sellers act…
As Machine Learning (ML) models are becoming increasingly complex, one of the central challenges is their deployment at scale, such that companies and organizations can create value through Artificial Intelligence (AI). An emerging paradigm…
In this paper we propose a two-stage protocol for resource management in a hierarchically organized cloud. The first stage exploits spatial locality for the formation of coalitions of supply agents; the second stage, a combinatorial…
Cyber defense operations increasingly require long-term strategic planning under uncertainty and resource constraints. We propose a new use of combinatorial auctions for allocating defensive action bundles in a realistic cyber environment,…
In this article we consider combinatorial markets with valuations only for singletons and pairs of buy/sell-orders for swapping two items in equal quantity. We provide an algorithm that permits polynomial time market-clearing and -pricing.…
Online advertising has become a core revenue driver for the internet industry, with ad auctions playing a crucial role in ensuring platform revenue and advertiser incentives. Traditional auction mechanisms, like GSP, rely on the independent…
This paper presents positive initial evidence that generative agents can relax the rigidity of traditional mathematical models for human decision-making in power dispatch and auction settings. We design two proof-of-concept energy…
Myerson's seminal work provides a computationally efficient revenue-optimal auction for selling one item to multiple bidders. Generalizing this work to selling multiple items at once has been a central question in economics and algorithmic…
Iterative learning control (ILC) improves the performance of a repetitive system by learning from previous trials. ILC can be combined with Model Predictive Control (MPC) to mitigate non-repetitive disturbances, thus improving overall…
Motivated by Carbon Emissions Trading Schemes, Treasury Auctions, Procurement Auctions, and Wholesale Electricity Markets, which all involve the auctioning of homogeneous multiple units, we consider the problem of learning how to bid in…
We consider the problem of an auctioneer who faces the task of selling a good (drawn from a known distribution) to a set of buyers, when the auctioneer does not have the capacity to describe to the buyers the exact identity of the good that…
We study multi-unit auctions in which bidders have limited knowledge of opponent strategies and values. We characterize optimal prior-free bids; these bids minimize the maximal loss in expected utility resulting from uncertainty surrounding…