Related papers: Collaborative Coalitions in Multi-Agent Systems: Q…
We present new coordination mechanisms for scheduling selfish jobs on $m$ unrelated machines. A coordination mechanism aims to mitigate the impact of selfishness of jobs on the efficiency of schedules by defining a local scheduling policy…
Algorithmic-matching sites offer users access to an unprecedented number of potential mates. However, they also pose a principal-agent problem with a potential moral hazard. The agent's interest is to maximize usage of the Web site, while…
With artificial intelligence systems becoming ubiquitous in our society, its designers will soon have to start to consider its social dimension, as many of these systems will have to interact among them to work efficiently. With this in…
This paper introduces a novel spatial interaction model to explore the decision-making processes of a resource allocator and local agents, with central and local governments serving as empirical representations. The model captures two key…
Efficient allocation and use of limited resources are fundamental to advancing collective welfare and achieving long-term societal sustainability. This challenge involves not only how policymakers distribute scarce resources among…
We study assignment games in which jobs select machines, and in which certain pairs of jobs may conflict, which is to say they may incur an additional cost when they are both assigned to the same machine, beyond that associated with the…
We consider the framework of average aggregative games, where the cost function of each agent depends on his own strategy and on the average population strategy. We focus on the case in which the agents are coupled not only via their cost…
We study the inefficiency of mixed equilibria, expressed as the price of anarchy, of all-pay auctions in three different environments: combinatorial, multi-unit and single-item auctions. First, we consider item-bidding combinatorial…
We study a general scenario of simultaneous contests that allocate prizes based on equal sharing: each contest awards its prize to all players who satisfy some contest-specific criterion, and the value of this prize to a winner decreases as…
Sharing economy is a distributed peer-to-peer economic paradigm, which gives rise to a variety of social interactions for economic purposes. One fundamental distributed decision-making process is coalition formation for sharing certain…
The decisions that human beings make to allocate time has significant bearing on economic output and to the sustenance of social networks. The time allocation problem motivates our formal analysis of the resource allocation game, where…
We consider polymatrix coordination games with individual preferences where every player corresponds to a node in a graph who plays with each neighbor a separate bimatrix game with non-negative symmetric payoffs. In this paper, we study…
This paper proposes a novel game-theoretical autonomous decision-making framework to address a task allocation problem for a swarm of multiple agents. We consider cooperation of self-interested agents, and show that our proposed…
The emergent behavior of a distributed system is conditioned by the information available to the local decision-makers. Therefore, one may expect that providing decision-makers with more information will improve system performance; in this…
We study a game-theoretic variant of the maximum circulation problem. In a flow allocation game, we are given a directed flow network. Each node is a rational agent and can strategically allocate any incoming flow to the outgoing edges.…
We consider network aggregative games to model and study multi-agent populations in which each rational agent is influenced by the aggregate behavior of its neighbors, as specified by an underlying network. Specifically, we examine systems…
We propose a distributed algorithm for multiagent systems that aim to optimize a common objective when agents differ in their estimates of the objective-relevant state of the environment. Each agent keeps an estimate of the environment and…
Self-optimizing behaviors can lead to outcomes where collective benefits are ultimately destroyed, a well-known phenomenon known as the ``tragedy of the commons". These scenarios are widely studied using game-theoretic approaches to analyze…
The Price of Anarchy (PoA) is a well-established game-theoretic concept to shed light on coordination issues arising in open distributed systems. Leaving agents to selfishly optimize comes with the risk of ending up in sub-optimal states…
In this paper, we investigate the noncooperative games of multi-agent systems. Different from existing noncooperative games, our formulation involves the high-order nonlinear dynamics of players, and the communication topologies among…