Related papers: A Study of MEV Extraction Techniques on a First-Co…
Autonomous Market Makers (AMMs) rely on arbitrage to facilitate passive price updates. Liquidity fragmentation poses a complex challenge across different blockchain networks. This paper proposes FluxLayer, a solution to mitigate fragmented…
The Ethereum block-building process has changed significantly since the emergence of Proposer-Builder Separation. Validators access blocks through a marketplace, where block builders bid for the right to construct the block and earn MEV…
Many blockchain platform are subject to maximal value extraction (MEV), and users on the platform are losing money while sending transactions because the transaction order can be manipulated to extract value from them. Consensus protocols…
The rapid growth of Blockchain and Decentralized Finance (DeFi) has introduced new challenges and vulnerabilities that threaten the integrity and efficiency of the ecosystem. This study identifies critical issues such as Transaction Order…
Block production on the Ethereum blockchain has adopted an auction-based mechanism known as Proposer--Builder Separation (PBS), where validators outsource block creation to builders competing in MEV--Boost auctions for Maximal Extractable…
Blockchains, and specifically smart contracts, have promised to create fair and transparent trading ecosystems. Unfortunately, we show that this promise has not been met. We document and quantify the widespread and rising deployment of…
Users of decentralized finance (DeFi) applications face significant risks from adversarial actions that manipulate the order of transactions to extract value from users. Such actions -- an adversarial form of what is called…
Blockchains have popularized the Automated Market Makers (AMMs), where users trade crypto-assets directly with a smart contract, governed by a pricing function embedded in the contract's code. Today, users of AMMs are often forced to accept…
The incentive-compatibility properties of blockchain transaction fee mechanisms have been investigated with *passive* block producers that are motivated purely by the net rewards earned at the consensus layer. This paper introduces a model…
We present a comprehensive analysis of the implications of artificial latency in the Proposer-Builder Separation framework on the Ethereum network. Focusing on the MEV-Boost auction system, we analyze how strategic latency manipulation…
With the emergence of Miner Extractable Value (MEV), block construction markets on blockchains have evolved into a competitive arena. Following Ethereum's transition from Proof of Work (PoW) to Proof of Stake (PoS), the Proposer Builder…
In blockchain systems operating under the Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus mechanism, fairness in transaction processing is essential to preserving decentralization and maintaining user trust. However, with the emergence of Maximal…
Centralized stablecoins such as USDT and USDC enforce sanctions through contract-layer blacklist functions. Yet on public blockchains, a freeze is still an ordinary transaction competing with the sanctioned party's transfer for priority. It…
Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are essential to decentralized finance, offering continuous liquidity and enabling intermediary-free trading on blockchains. However, participants in AMMs are vulnerable to Maximal Extractable Value (MEV)…
Ethereum block builders run sealed auctions among searchers, but nothing in the protocol forces a builder to honor the auction outcome after observing submitted bundles. This paper studies the commitment problem. We model a builder who…
Layer 2 rollups are rapidly absorbing DeFi activity, securing over $40 billion and accounting for nearly half of Ethereum's DEX volume by Q1 2025, yet their MEV dynamics remain understudied. We address this gap by defining and quantifying…
This paper provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of the economics and dynamics behind arbitrages between centralized and decentralized exchanges (CEX-DEX) on Ethereum. We refine heuristics to identify arbitrage transactions from…
This paper introduces a trade ordering rule that aims to reduce intra-block price volatility in Automated Market Maker (AMM) powered decentralized exchanges. The ordering rule introduced here, Clever Look-ahead Volatility Reduction (CLVR),…
With the rapid growth of Internet of Things (IoT) applications, there's a big demand for more processing power and resources in devices. Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) looks promising for enhancing performance and reducing costs by offloading…
Two MEV builders now produce nearly 80\% of Ethereum blocks. Block builders have the ability to reorder transactions on the blockchain in a way that can be harmful to participants. We estimate they would pay in the aggregate nearly \$14…