Related papers: The Expected Shapley value on a class of probabili…

The Shapley value is one of the most important solution concepts in cooperative game theory. In coalitional games without externalities, it allows to compute a unique payoff division that meets certain desirable fairness axioms. However, in…

This paper studies cooperative games where coalitions are formed online and the value generated by the grand coalition must be irrevocably distributed among the players at each timestep. We investigate the fundamental issue of strategic…

A valuation for a player in a game in extensive form is an assignment of numeric values to the players moves. The valuation reflects the desirability moves. We assume a myopic player, who chooses a move with the highest valuation.…

The computation of a solution concept of a cooperative game usually employs values of all coalitions. However, in some applications, the values of some of the coalitions might be unknown due to high costs associated with their determination…

Attribution scores reflect how important the feature values in an input entity are for the output of a machine learning model. One of the most popular attribution scores is the SHAP score, which is an instantiation of the general Shapley…

A number of techniques have been proposed to explain a machine learning model's prediction by attributing it to the corresponding input features. Popular among these are techniques that apply the Shapley value method from cooperative game…

Cooperative game theory has diverse applications in contemporary artificial intelligence, including domains like interpretable machine learning, resource allocation, and collaborative decision-making. However, specifying a cooperative game…

The Shapley value---probably the most important normative payoff division scheme in coalitional games---has recently been advocated as a useful measure of centrality in networks. However, although this approach has a variety of real-world…

This paper proposes a novel approach to explain the predictions made by data-driven methods. Since such predictions rely heavily on the data used for training, explanations that convey information about how the training data affects the…

We revisit games in partition function form, i.e. cooperative games where the payoff of a coalition depends on the partition of the entire set of players. We assume that each coalition computes its worth having probabilistic beliefs over…

This paper introduces a measure of uncertainty in the determination of the Shapley value, illustrates it with examples, and studies some of its properties. The introduced measure of uncertainty quantifies random variations in a player's…

The Shapley value is a common tool in game theory to evaluate the importance of a player in a cooperative setting. In a geometric context, it provides a way to measure the contribution of a geometric object in a set towards some function on…

The Shapley value is a game-theoretic notion for wealth distribution that is nowadays extensively used to explain complex data-intensive computation, for instance, in network analysis or machine learning. Recent theoretical works show that…

The research on coalitional games has focused on how to share the reward among a coalition such that players are incentivised to collaborate together. It assumes that the (deterministic or stochastic) characteristic function is known in…

We consider the problem of social choice when transfers between agents are possible. This includes several canonical applications: public-good provision, management of a common resource, settlement of debts, and division of goods. The…

Shapley values have become increasingly popular in the machine learning literature thanks to their attractive axiomatisation, flexibility, and uniqueness in satisfying certain notions of `fairness'. The flexibility arises from the myriad…

Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people in multiple groups based on their individual preferences. This pa- per suggests an approach to this problem in the framework of a non- cooperative game theory. Definition of…

In allocation problems, a given set of goods are assigned to agents in such a way that the social welfare is maximised, that is, the largest possible global worth is achieved. When goods are indivisible, it is possible to use money…

Electing a committee of size k from m alternatives (k < m) is an interesting problem under the multi-winner voting rules. However, very few committee selection rules found in the literature consider the coalitional possibilities among the…

The model of incomplete cooperative games incorporates uncertainty into the classical model of cooperative games by considering a partial characteristic function. Thus the values for some of the coalitions are not known. The main focus of…