Related papers: Position Uncertainty in a Sequential Public Goods …
In a social dilemma, cooperation is collectively optimal, yet individually each group member prefers to defect. A class of successful strategies of direct reciprocity were recently found for the iterated prisoner's dilemma and for the…
The tragedy of the commons illustrates a fundamental social dilemma where individual rational actions lead to collectively undesired outcomes, threatening the sustainability of shared resources. Strategies to escape this dilemma, however,…
In this paper we study continuous-time stochastic control problems with both monotone and classical controls motivated by the so-called public good contribution problem. That is the problem of n economic agents aiming to maximize their…
We introduce a class of learning problems where the agent is presented with a series of tasks. Intuitively, if there is relation among those tasks, then the information gained during execution of one task has value for the execution of…
An individually costly act that benefits all group members is a public good. Natural selection favors individual contribution to public goods only when some benefit to the individual offsets the cost of contribution. Problems of sex ratio,…
Cooperation in repeated public goods game is hardly achieved, unless contingent behavior is present. Surely, if mechanisms promoting positive assortment between cooperators are present, then cooperators may beat defectors, because…
In dyadic models of indirect reciprocity, the receivers' history of giving has a significant impact on the donor's decision. When the interaction involves more than two agents things become more complicated, and in large groups cooperation…
Sequential equilibrium is the conventional approach for analyzing multi-stage games of incomplete information. It relies on mutual consistency of beliefs. To relax mutual consistency, I theoretically and experimentally explore the dynamic…
Economic experiments reveal that humans value cooperation and fairness. Punishing unfair behavior is therefore common, and according to the theory of strong reciprocity, it is also directly related to rewarding cooperative behavior.…
Evolutionary game theory assumes that individuals maximize their benefits when choosing strategies. However, an alternative perspective proposes that individuals seek to maximize the benefits of others. To explore the relationship between…
We formulate and study a general time-varying multi-agent system where players repeatedly compete under incomplete information. Our work is motivated by scenarios commonly observed in online advertising and retail marketplaces, where agents…
Sequential auctions for identical items with unit-demand, private-value buyers are common and often occur periodically without end, as new bidders replace departing ones. We model bidder uncertainty by introducing a probability that a…
Purpose: We propose a model to present a possible mechanism for obtaining sizeable behavioural structures by simulating an agent based on the evolutionary public good game with available social learning. Methods: The model considered a…
Economic ensembles can be modeled as networks of interacting agents whose be-haviors are described in terms of game theory. The evolutionary paradigm has been applied to two-person games to discover strategies in this context.…
This paper studies a dynamic discrete-time queuing model where at every period players get a new job and must send all their jobs to a queue that has a limited capacity. Players have an incentive to send their jobs as late as possible;…
Prosocial behaviors are encountered in the donation game, the prisoner's dilemma, relaxed social dilemmas, and public goods games. Many studies assume that the population structure is homogeneous, meaning all individuals have the same…
In social dilemmas self-interested learning agents face the choice between the societal benefit of cooperation and the immediate reward of defection. Significant evidence exists on the benefits of assortment mechanisms such as partner…
Understanding the nature of strategic voting is the holy grail of social choice theory, where game-theory, social science and recently computational approaches are all applied in order to model the incentives and behavior of voters. In a…
This paper relaxes the common prior assumption in the public and private information game of Morris and Shin (2000, 2004). For the generalized game, where the agent's prior expectations are heterogenous, it derives a sharp condition for the…
The theoretical description of the evolution of cooperation presented by Bergstrom based on assortative matching with partner choice allows to model the population dynamics in a game of Nonrepetitive Prisoners Dilemma. In this paper we…