Related papers: Bayesian Rationality in Satisfaction Games
Network congestion games are a well-understood model of multi-agent strategic interactions. Despite their ubiquitous applications, it is not clear whether it is possible to design information structures to ameliorate the overall experience…
Nash equilibria provide a principled framework for modeling interactions in multi-agent decision-making and control. However, many equilibrium-seeking methods implicitly assume that each agent has access to the other agents' objectives and…
We study a setting in which two players play a (possibly approximate) Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game, while a learner observes only their actions and has no knowledge of the equilibrium or the underlying game. A natural question is…
We present a subjective equilibrium notion (called "subjective equilibrium under beliefs of exogenous uncertainty (SEBEU)" for stochastic dynamic games in which each player chooses her decisions under the (incorrect) belief that a…
An important challenge in non-cooperative game theory is coordinating on a single (approximate) equilibrium from many possibilities - a challenge that becomes even more complex when players hold private information. Recommender mechanisms…
We study time-inconsistent recursive stochastic control problems, i.e., for which the Bellman principle of optimality does not hold. For this class of problems classical optimal controls may fail to exist, or to be relevant in practice, and…
Bayesian optimization is a coherent, ubiquitous approach to decision-making under uncertainty, with applications including multi-arm bandits, active learning, and black-box optimization. Bayesian optimization selects decisions (i.e.…
In two-player cooperative games, agents can play together effectively when they have accurate assumptions about how their teammate will behave, but may perform poorly when these assumptions are inaccurate. In language games, failure may be…
When a prediction algorithm serves a collection of users, disparities in prediction quality are likely to emerge. If users respond to accurate predictions by increasing engagement, inviting friends, or adopting trends, repeated learning…
Interactions between people are the basis on which the structure of our society arises as a complex system and, at the same time, are the starting point of any physical description of it. In the last few years, much theoretical research has…
The best-response dynamics is an example of an evolutionary game where players update their strategy in order to maximize their payoff. The main objective of this paper is to study a stochastic spatial version of this game based on the…
We consider normal-form games with $n$ players and two strategies for each player, where the payoffs are i.i.d. random variables with some distribution $F$ and we consider issues related to the pure equilibria in the game as the number of…
This paper considers a time-varying game with $N$ players. Every time slot, players observe their own random events and then take a control action. The events and control actions affect the individual utilities earned by each player. The…
As Aumann stated, cooperation and non-cooperation are different ways of viewing the same game, with the main difference being whether players can reach a binding cooperative agreement. In the real world, many games often coexist competition…
The combination of the Bayesian game and learning has a rich history, with the idea of controlling a single agent in a system composed of multiple agents with unknown behaviors given a set of types, each specifying a possible behavior for…
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in games on graphs within the research community, fueled by their relevance in applications such as economics, politics, and epidemiology. This paper aims to comprehensively detail the…
In~[1],authors considered a general finite horizon model of dynamic game of asymmetric information, where N players have types evolving as independent Markovian process, where each player observes its own type perfectly and actions of all…
Corrigibility of autonomous agents is an under explored part of system design, with previous work focusing on single agent systems. It has been suggested that uncertainty over the human preferences acts to keep the agents corrigible, even…
This paper proposes the notion of robust PBE in a general competing mechanism game of incomplete information where a mechanism allows its designer to send a message to himself at the same time agents send messages. It identifies the utility…
We consider a stochastic dynamic game where players have their own linear state dynamics and quadratic cost functions. Players are coupled through some environment variables, generated by another linear system driven by the states and…