Related papers: Social Optimum Equilibrium Selection for Distribut…

Multi-agent learning algorithms have been shown to display complex, unstable behaviours in a wide array of games. In fact, previous works indicate that convergent behaviours are less likely to occur as the total number of agents increases.…

This paper investigates a fully distributed adaptive Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking algorithm for constrained noncooperative games with prescribed-time stability. On the one hand, prescribed-time stability for the proposed NE seeking…

Consider a strongly monotone game where the players' utility functions include a reward function and a linear term for each dimension, with coefficients that are controlled by the manager. Gradient play converges to a unique Nash…

One key in real-life Nash equilibrium applications is to calibrate players' cost functions. To leverage the approximation ability of neural networks, we proposed a general framework for optimizing and learning Nash equilibrium using neural…

In this paper, we focus on the stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium problem (SGNEP) which is an important and widely-used model in many different fields. In this model, subject to certain global resource constraints, a set of…

We present a new, distributed method to compute approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. In contrast to previous approaches that analyze the two payoff matrices at the same time (for example, by solving a single LP that combines the…

Multi-agent decision problems are typically solved via distributed iterative algorithms, where the agents only communicate between themselves on a peer-to-peer network. Each agent usually maintains a copy of each decision variable, while…

The Kelly or proportional allocation mechanism is a simple and efficient auction-based scheme that distributes an infinitely divisible resource proportionally to the agents bids. When agents are aware of the allocation rule, their…

In multi-agent autonomous systems, deception is a fundamental concept which characterizes the exploitation of unbalanced information to mislead victims into choosing oblivious actions. This effectively alters the system's long term…

To achieve an optimal outcome in many situations, agents need to choose distinct actions from one another. This is the case notably in many resource allocation problems, where a single resource can only be used by one agent at a time. How…

We study the limiting behavior of the mixed strategies that result from optimal no-regret learning strategies in a repeated game setting where the stage game is any 2 by 2 competitive game. We consider optimal no-regret algorithms that are…

Multiplayer games with selfish agents naturally occur in the design of distributed and embedded systems. As the goals of selfish agents are usually neither equivalent nor antagonistic to each other, such games are non zero-sum games. We…

We study a general version of the adversarial online learning problem. We are given a decision set $\mathcal{X}$ in a reflexive Banach space $X$ and a sequence of reward vectors in the dual space of $X$. At each iteration, we choose an…

This paper investigates a class of games with large strategy spaces, motivated by challenges in AI alignment and language games. We introduce the hidden game problem, where for each player, an unknown subset of strategies consistently…

One of the natural objectives of the field of the social networks is to predict agents' behaviour. To better understand the spread of various products through a social network arXiv:1105.2434 introduced a threshold model, in which the nodes…

We define a class of zero-sum games with combinatorial structure, where the best response problem of one player is to maximize a submodular function. For example, this class includes security games played on networks, as well as the problem…

We consider the problem of episodic reinforcement learning where there are multiple stakeholders with different reward functions. Our goal is to output a policy that is socially fair with respect to different reward functions. Prior works…

Policy Space Response Oracle methods (PSRO) provide a general solution to learn Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games but suffer from two drawbacks: (1) the computation inefficiency due to the need for consistent meta-game…

Modeling the purposeful behavior of imperfect agents from a small number of observations is a challenging task. When restricted to the single-agent decision-theoretic setting, inverse optimal control techniques assume that observed behavior…

In this paper, the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium of a multi-player game is considered. The players are only aware of their own cost functions as well as the action space of all players. We develop a relatively fast algorithm within…