Related papers: Ergodic Mean-Field Games of Singular Control with …
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…
We present an example of symmetric ergodic $N$-players differential games, played in memory strategies on the position of the players, for which the limit set, as $N\to +\infty$, of Nash equilibrium payoffs is large, although the game has a…
In this article, we introduce a new class of entropy-penalized robust mean field game problems in which the representative agent is opposed to Nature. The agent's objective is formulated as a min-max stochastic control problem, in which…
We consider a general class of finite-player stochastic games with mean-field interaction, in which the linear-quadratic cost functional includes linear operators acting on controls in $L^2$. We propose a novel approach for deriving the…
We are interested in the study of stochastic games for which each player faces an optimal stopping problem. In our setting, the players may interact through the criterion to optimise as well as through their dynamics. After briefly…
This thesis is going to give a gentle introduction to Mean Field Games. It aims to produce a coherent text beginning for simple notions of deterministic control theory progressively to current Mean Field Games theory. The framework…
We study a class of linear-quadratic stochastic differential games in which each player interacts directly only with its nearest neighbors in a given graph. We find a semi-explicit Markovian equilibrium for any transitive graph, in terms of…
Empirically derived continuum models of collective behavior among large populations of dynamic agents are a subject of intense study in several fields, including biology, engineering and finance. We formulate and study a mean-field game…
We formulate a stochastic game of mean field type where the agents solve optimal stopping problems and interact through the proportion of players that have already stopped. Working with a continuum of agents, typical equilibria become…
In this paper, we consider a mean field game (MFG) with a major and $N$ minor agents. We first consider the limiting problem and allow the coefficients to vary with the conditional distribution in a nonlinear way. We use the stochastic…
We propose a new approach to mean field games with major and minor players. Our formulation involves a two player game where the optimization of the representative minor player is standard while the major player faces an optimization over…
Mean-field games (MFG) were introduced to efficiently analyze approximate Nash equilibria in large population settings. In this work, we consider entropy-regularized mean-field games with a finite state-action space in a discrete time…
Mean field games are studied by means of the weak formulation of stochastic optimal control. This approach allows the mean field interactions to enter through both state and control processes and take a form which is general enough to…
Mean field games are limit models for symmetric $N$-player games with interaction of mean field type as $N\to\infty$. The limit relation is often understood in the sense that a solution of a mean field game allows to construct approximate…
This paper is concerned with a class of linear-quadratic stochastic large-population problems with partial information, where the individual agent only has access to a noisy observation process related to the state. The dynamics of each…
In this paper, we investigate a class of mean field games where the mean field interactions are achieved through the joint (conditional) distribution of the controlled state and the control process. The strategies are of $open\;loop$ type,…
We study Nash equilibria for the deterministic ergodic N-players game. We introduce pure strategies, mixed strategies and Nash equilibria associated with those. We show that a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies exists and it is a Mather…
We establish the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium for a stochastic mean-field game of optimal investment. The analysis covers both finite and infinite time horizons, and the mean-field interaction of the representative company…
We consider a class of mean field games in which the agents interact through both their states and controls, and we focus on situations in which a generic agent tries to adjust her speed (control) to an average speed (the average is made in…
Subject to reasonable conditions, in large population stochastic dynamics games, where the agents are coupled by the system's mean field (i.e. the state distribution of the generic agent) through their nonlinear dynamics and their nonlinear…