Related papers: The secretary problem with items arriving accordin…
This paper introduces a heuristic framework for the Best Secretary Problem, where one item must be selected using rank information only. We develop five data-responsive rules extending classical fixed-cutoff methods: an expected-record…
There are two major models of value uncertainty in the optimal stopping literature: the secretary model, which assumes no prior knowledge, and the prophet inequality model, which assumes full information about value distributions. In…
The sequential allocation protocol is a simple and popular mechanism to allocate indivisible goods, in which the agents take turns to pick the items according to a predefined sequence. While this protocol is not strategy-proof, it has been…
One way to interpret the classical secretary problem (CSP) is to consider it as a special case of the following problem. We observe $n$ independent indicator variables $I_1,I_2,\dotsc,I_n$ sequentially and we try to stop on the last…
We consider a problem wherein jobs arrive at random times and assume random values. Upon each job arrival, the decision-maker must decide immediately whether or not to accept the job and gain the value on offer as a reward, with the…
We study a game between $N$ job applicants who incur a cost $c$ (relative to the job value) to reveal their type during interviews and an administrator who seeks to maximize the probability of hiring the best. We define a full learning…
In the ordinal Matroid Secretary Problem (MSP), elements from a weighted matroid are presented in random order to an algorithm that must incrementally select a large weight independent set. However, the algorithm can only compare pairs of…
In the Online Machine Covering problem jobs, defined by their sizes, arrive one by one and have to be assigned to $m$ parallel and identical machines, with the goal of maximizing the load of the least-loaded machine. In this work, we study…
Imagine a large firm with multiple departments that plans a large recruitment. Candidates arrive one-by-one, and for each candidate the firm decides, based on her data (CV, skills, experience, etc), whether to summon her for an interview.…
Contention resolution schemes have proven to be a useful and unifying abstraction for a variety of constrained optimization problems, in both offline and online arrival models. Much of prior work restricts attention to product distributions…
We consider online resource allocation problems where given a set of requests our goal is to select a subset that maximizes a value minus cost type of objective function. Requests are presented online in random order, and each request…
We show that the matroid secretary problem is equivalent to correlated contention resolution in the online random-order model. Specifically, the matroid secretary conjecture is true if and only if every matroid admits an online random-order…
The classical secretary problem investigates the question of how to hire the best secretary from $n$ candidates who come in a uniformly random order. In this work we investigate a parallel generalizations of this problem introduced by…
In the paper the generalisation of the well known "secretary problem" is considered. The aim of the paper is to give a generalised model in such a way that the chosen set of the possible best $k$ elements have to be independent of all…
We initiate the work on maximin share (MMS) fair allocation of m indivisible chores to n agents using only their ordinal preferences, from both algorithmic and mechanism design perspectives. The previous best-known approximation is 2-1/n by…
In this paper, we present a novel method for computing the asymptotic values of both the optimal threshold, and the probability of success in sequences of optimal stopping problems. This method, based on the resolution of a first-order…
In the secretary problem, a set of secretary candidates arrive in a uniformly random order and reveal their values one by one. A company, who can only hire one candidate and hopes to maximize the expected value of its hire, needs to make…
This paper answers a long-standing open question concerning the $1/e$-strategy for the problem of best choice. $N$ candidates for a job arrive at times independently uniformly distributed in $[0,1]$. The interviewer knows how each candidate…
In the symmetric rendezvous problem two players follow the same (randomized) strategy to visit one of $n$ locations in each time step $t=0,1,2,\dots$. Their goal is to minimize the expected time until they visit the same location and thus…
In the classical prophet inequality, a gambler faces a sequence of items, whose values are drawn independently from known distributions. Upon the arrival of each item, its value is realized and the gambler either accepts it and the game…