Related papers: On Borrowed Time -- Preventing Static Side-Channel…

Cache timing attacks use shared caches in multi-core processors as side channels to extract information from victim processes. These attacks are particularly dangerous in cloud infrastructures, in which the deployed countermeasures cause…

Integrated Circuits (ICs) are the target of diverse attacks during their lifetime. Fabrication-time attacks, such as the insertion of Hardware Trojans, can give an adversary access to privileged data and/or the means to corrupt the IC's…

Neural networks are increasingly used for intrusion detection on industrial control systems (ICS). With neural networks being vulnerable to adversarial examples, attackers who wish to cause damage to an ICS can attempt to hide their attacks…

Low-power wide-area network technologies such as LoRaWAN are promising for collecting low-rate monitoring data from geographically distributed sensors, in which timestamping the sensor data is a critical system function. This paper…

The side-channel attack is an attack method based on the information gained about implementations of computer systems, rather than weaknesses in algorithms. Information about system characteristics such as power consumption, electromagnetic…

Screaming-channel attacks enable Electromagnetic (EM) Side-Channel Attacks (SCAs) at larger distances due to higher EM leakage energies than traditional SCAs, relaxing the requirement of close access to the victim. This attack can be…

Timing information leakage occurs whenever an attacker successfully deduces confidential internal information by observing some timed information such as events with timestamps. Timed automata are an extension of finite-state automata with…

Many operations in power grids, such as fault detection and event location estimation, depend on precise timing information. In this paper, a novel Time Synchronization Attack (TSA) is proposed to attack the timing information in smart…

Passive operating system fingerprinting reveals valuable information to the defenders of heterogeneous private networks; at the same time, attackers can use fingerprinting to reconnoiter networks, so defenders need obfuscation techniques to…

This paper investigates the vulnerability of discrete-time linear time-invariant systems to stealthy sensor attacks during the learning phase. In particular, we demonstrate that a {data-driven} adversary, without access to the system model,…

Microarchitectural side channels expose unprotected software to information leakage attacks where a software adversary is able to track runtime behavior of a benign process and steal secrets such as cryptographic keys. As suggested by…

Automobiles are equipped with Electronic Control Units (ECU) that communicate via in-vehicle network protocol standards such as Controller Area Network (CAN). These protocols are designed under the assumption that separating in-vehicle…

Recent work has highlighted the risks of intellectual property (IP) piracy of deep learning (DL) models from the side-channel leakage of DL hardware accelerators. In response, to provide side-channel leakage resiliency to DL hardware…

Maintaining the security of control systems in the presence of integrity attacks is a significant challenge. In literature, several possible attacks against control systems have been formulated including replay, false data injection, and…

Electronic countermeasures involving radar signals are an important aspect of modern warfare. Traditional electronic countermeasures techniques typically add large-scale interference signals to ensure interference effects, which can lead to…

During the last decade, Deep Neural Networks (DNN) have progressively been integrated on all types of platforms, from data centers to embedded systems including low-power processors and, recently, FPGAs. Neural Networks (NN) are expected to…

Many operations in power grids, such as fault detection and event location estimation, depend on precise timing information. In this paper, a novel time stamp attack (TSA) is proposed to attack the timing information in smart grid. Since…

Microarchitectural timing attacks exploit subtle timing variations caused by hardware behaviors to leak sensitive information. In this paper, we introduce MCHammer, a novel side-channel technique that leverages machine clears induced by…

We propose a novel approach for performing side-channel attacks on elliptic curve cryptography. Unlike previous approaches and inspired by the ``activity detection'' literature, we adopt a long-short-term memory (LSTM) neural network to…

Side-channel attacks (SCAs) pose a serious threat to system security by extracting secret keys through physical leakages such as power consumption, timing variations, and electromagnetic emissions. Among existing countermeasures, artificial…