Related papers: Information Leakage from Optical Emanations
The light-emitting diode(LED) is widely used as an indicator on the information device. Early in 2002, Loughry et al studied the exfiltration of LED indicators and found the kind of LEDs unmodulated to indicate some state of the device can…
It is possible to attack a computer remotely through the front panel LEDs. Following on previous results that showed information leakage at optical wavelengths, now it seems practicable to inject information into a system as well. It is…
In this paper we show how attackers can covertly leak data (e.g., encryption keys, passwords and files) from highly secure or air-gapped networks via the row of status LEDs that exists in networking equipment such as LAN switches and…
Highly secure devices are often isolated from the Internet or other public networks due to the confidential information they process. This level of isolation is referred to as an 'air-gap .' In this paper, we present a new technique named…
Using the keyboard LEDs to send data optically was proposed in 2002 by Loughry and Umphress [1] (Appendix A). In this paper we extensively explore this threat in the context of a modern cyber-attack with current hardware and optical…
Unintended electromagnetic emissions, called EM emanations, can be exploited to recover sensitive information, posing security risks. Metal shielding, used by defense organizations to prevent data leakage, is costly and impractical for…
Modern Internet-enabled smart lights promise energy efficiency and many additional capabilities over traditional lamps. However, these connected lights create a new attack surface, which can be maliciously used to violate users' privacy and…
In this paper we present a method which allows attackers to covertly leak data from isolated, air-gapped computers. Our method utilizes the hard disk drive (HDD) activity LED which exists in most of today's desktop PCs, laptops and servers.…
Identifying features that leak information about sensitive attributes is a key challenge in the design of information obfuscation mechanisms. In this paper, we propose a framework to identify information-leaking features via information…
Electronic devices and cables inadvertently emit RF emissions as a byproduct of signal processing and/or transmission. Labeled as electromagnetic emanations, they form an EM side-channel for data leakage. Previously, it was believed that…
Research on optical TEMPEST has moved forward since 2002 when the first pair of papers on the subject emerged independently and from widely separated locations in the world within a week of each other. Since that time, vulnerabilities have…
Physical side-channel attacks represent a great challenge for today's chip design. Although attacks on CMOS dynamic power represent a class of state-of-the-art attacks, many other effects potentially affect the security of CMOS chips…
An unconventional encoding scheme called concurrent coding, has recently been demonstrated and shown to offer interesting features and benefits in comparison to conventional techniques, e.g. robustness against burst errors and improved…
This paper experimentally demonstrates that the AC impedance spectrum of the LED as a photodetector heavily depends on the received optical power, which may cause the impedance mismatch between the LED and the post trans-impedance…
This paper presents a new optical integrated sensing and communication (O-ISAC) framework tailored for cost-effective Light-Emitting Diode (LED) for enhanced Internet of Things (IoT) applications. Unlike prior research on ISAC, which…
Cyber-physical systems can be subject to information leakage; in the presence of continuous variables such as time and energy, these leaks can be subtle to detect. We study here the verification of opacity problems over systems with…
Discovering new vulnerabilities and implementing security and privacy measures are important to protect systems and data against physical attacks. One such vulnerability is impedance, an inherent property of a device that can be exploited…
Air-gapped computers are systems that are kept isolated from the Internet since they store or process sensitive information. In this paper, we introduce an optical covert channel in which an attacker can leak (or, exfiltlrate) sensitive…
Information leakage to a guessing adversary in index coding is studied, where some messages in the system are sensitive and others are not. The non-sensitive messages can be used by the server like secret keys to mitigate leakage of the…
Optical identification is often done with spatial or temporal visual pattern recognition and localization. Temporal pattern recognition, depending on the technology, involves a trade-off between communication frequency, range and accurate…