Related papers: Complete Conditional Type Structures (Extended Abs…
Hierarchies of conditional beliefs (Battigalli and Siniscalchi 1999) play a central role for the epistemic analysis of solution concepts in sequential games. They are modelled by type structures, which allow the analyst to represent the…
We establish the existence of the universal type structure in presence of conditioning events without any topological assumption, namely, a type structure that is terminal, belief-complete, and non-redundant, by performing a construction…
We construct the universal type structure for conditional probability systems without any topological assumption, namely a type structure that is terminal, belief-complete, and non-redundant. In particular, in order to obtain the…
When modeling game situations of incomplete information one usually considers the players' hierarchies of beliefs, a source of all sorts of complications. Hars\'anyi (1967-68)'s idea henceforth referred to as the "Hars\'anyi program" is…
We characterize common assumption of rationality of 2-person games within an incomplete information framework. We use the lexicographic model with incomplete information and show that a belief hierarchy expresses common assumption of…
Axioms are presented which encapsulate the properties satisfied by categories of games which form the basis of results on full abstraction for PCF and other programming languages, and on full completeness for various logics and type…
Iterated admissibility (IA) can be seen as exhibiting a minimal criterion of rationality in games. In order to make this intuition more precise, the epistemic characterization of this game-theoretic solution has been actively investigated…
This paper provides an analysis of different formal representations of beliefs in epistemic game theory. The aim is to attempt a synthesis of different structures of beliefs in the presence of indeterminate probabilities. Special attention…
We characterize three interrelated concepts in epistemic game theory: permissibility, proper rationalizability, and iterated admissibility. We define the lexicographic epistemic model for a game with incomplete information. Based on it, we…
We study the behavioral implications of Rationality and Common Strong Belief in Rationality (RCSBR) with contextual assumptions allowing players to entertain misaligned beliefs, i.e., players can hold beliefs concerning their opponents'…
Following the decision-theoretic approach to game theory, we extend the analysis of Epstein & Wang and of Di Tillio from hierarchies of preference relations to hierarchies of choice functions. We then construct the universal choice…
We define notions of cautiousness and cautious belief to provide epistemic conditions for iterated admissibility in finite games. We show that iterated admissibility characterizes the behavioral implications of "cautious rationality and…
We give a general notion of combinatory completeness with respect to a faithful cartesian club and use it systematically to obtain characterisations of a number of different kinds of applicative system. Each faithful cartesian club…
We present a formal analysis of Douglas Hofstadter's concept of \emph{superrationality}. We start by defining superrationally justifiable actions, and study them in symmetric games. We then model the beliefs of the players, in a way that…
At the beginning of a dynamic game, players may have exogenous theories about how the opponents are going to play. Suppose that these theories are commonly known. Then, players will refine their first-order beliefs, and challenge their own…
There is a long history in game theory on the topic of Bayesian or "rational" learning, in which each player maintains beliefs over a set of alternative behaviours, or types, for the other players. This idea has gained increasing interest…
Game theory provides a mathematical framework for analysing strategic situations involving at least two players. Normal-form games model situations where the players simultaneously pick their moves. In this thesis we explore the strategic…
Consider an analyst who models a strategic situation using an incomplete information game. The true game may involve correlated, duplicated belief hierarchies, but the analyst lacks knowledge of the correlation structure and can only…
This paper develops a categorical framework to clarify the relationship between the completeness and compactness theorems in classical first-order logic. Rather than claiming that different model constructions yield naturally isomorphic…
Belief systems are often treated as globally consistent sets of propositions or as scalar-valued probability distributions. Such representations tend to obscure the internal structure of belief, conflate external credibility with internal…