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Partial-monitoring games constitute a mathematical framework for sequential decision making problems with imperfect feedback: The learner repeatedly chooses an action, opponent responds with an outcome, and then the learner suffers a loss…
Calibrated strategies can be obtained by performing strategies that have no internal regret in some auxiliary game. Such strategies can be constructed explicitly with the use of Blackwell's approachability theorem, in an other auxiliary…
This paper studies a dynamic discrete-time queuing model where at every period players get a new job and must send all their jobs to a queue that has a limited capacity. Players have an incentive to send their jobs as late as possible;…
We introduce DREAM, a deep reinforcement learning algorithm that finds optimal strategies in imperfect-information games with multiple agents. Formally, DREAM converges to a Nash Equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games and to an…
We study the open question of how players learn to play a social optimum pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) through repeated interactions in general-sum coordination games. A social optimum of a game is the stable Pareto-optimal state…
We consider the problem of a learning agent who has to repeatedly play a general sum game against a strategic opponent who acts to maximize their own payoff by optimally responding against the learner's algorithm. The learning agent knows…
We investigate the computation of equilibria in extensive-form games where ex ante correlation is possible, focusing on correlated equilibria requiring the least amount of communication between the players and the mediator. Motivated by the…
We revisit the problem of online learning with sleeping experts/bandits: in each time step, only a subset of the actions are available for the algorithm to choose from (and learn about). The work of Kleinberg et al. (2010) showed that there…
The minmax regret problem for combinatorial optimization under uncertainty can be viewed as a zero-sum game played between an optimizing player and an adversary, where the optimizing player selects a solution and the adversary selects costs…
Counterfactual regret minimization is a family of algorithms of no-regret learning dynamics capable of solving large-scale imperfect information games. We propose implementing this algorithm as a series of dense and sparse matrix and vector…
We demonstrate that, in the classical non-stochastic regret minimization problem with $d$ decisions, gains and losses to be respectively maximized or minimized are fundamentally different. Indeed, by considering the additional sparsity…
Regret minimization methods are a powerful tool for learning approximate Nash equilibrium (NE) in two-player zero-sum imperfect information extensive-form games (IIEGs). We consider the problem in the interactive bandit-feedback setting…
We define "decision swap regret" which generalizes both prediction for downstream swap regret and omniprediction, and give algorithms for obtaining it for arbitrary multi-dimensional Lipschitz loss functions in online adversarial settings.…
We study last-iterate convergence properties of algorithms for solving two-player zero-sum games based on Regret Matching$^+$ (RM$^+$). Despite their widespread use for solving real games, virtually nothing is known about their last-iterate…
This work addresses the problem of regret minimization in non-stochastic multi-armed bandit problems, focusing on performance guarantees that hold with high probability. Such results are rather scarce in the literature since proving them…
With the constraint of a no regret follower, will the players in a two-player Stackelberg game still reach Stackelberg equilibrium? We first show when the follower strategy is either reward-average or transform-reward-average, the two…
We study a cooperative multi-agent bandit setting in the distributed GOSSIP model: in every round, each of $n$ agents chooses an action from a common set, observes the action's corresponding reward, and subsequently exchanges information…
Inspired by real-time ad exchanges for online display advertising, we consider the problem of inferring a buyer's value distribution for a good when the buyer is repeatedly interacting with a seller through a posted-price mechanism. We…
We study the problem of guaranteeing low regret in repeated games against an opponent with unknown membership in one of several classes. We add the constraint that our algorithm is non-exploitable, in that the opponent lacks an incentive to…
This paper studies a variant of two-player zero-sum matrix games, where, at each timestep, the row player selects row $i$, the column player selects column $j$, and the row player receives a noisy reward with expected value $A_{i,j}$, along…