Related papers: Selling Data to a Competitor (Extended Abstract)
A data marketplace is an online venue that brings data owners, data brokers, and data consumers together and facilitates commoditisation of data amongst them. Data pricing, as a key function of a data marketplace, demands quantifying the…
We analyze the effect of sponsored data platforms when Internet service providers (ISPs) compete for subscribers and content providers (CPs) compete for a share of the bandwidth usage by the customers. Our analytical model is of a full…
We study the optimization problem of selecting numerical quantities to clean in order to fact-check claims based on such data. Oftentimes, such claims are technically correct, but they can still mislead for two reasons. First, data may…
We consider a nonlinear pricing environment with private information. We provide profit guarantees (and associated mechanisms) that the seller can achieve across all possible distributions of willingness to pay of the buyers. With a…
Big data has been emerging as a new approach in utilizing large datasets to optimize complex system operations. Big data is fueled with Internet-of-Things (IoT) services that generate immense sensory data from numerous sensors and devices.…
In a multi-party machine learning system, different parties cooperate on optimizing towards better models by sharing data in a privacy-preserving way. A major challenge in learning is the incentive issue. For example, if there is…
How do consultants price expertise? This paper studies a problem of selling information products (expertise) to a buyer (client) who faces decision-making problem under uncertainty. The client is privately informed about the type of…
With the rapid development of Internet of Things (IoT) and artificial intelligence technologies, data has become an important strategic resource in the new era. However, the growing demand for data has exacerbated the issue of \textit{data…
A multiproduct seller is more informed than consumers about the value of her products to consumers. The seller posts a price list and segments the market through cheap-talk communication. We find that when both seller's and consumers'…
When online sellers use AI learning algorithms to automatically compete on e-commerce platforms, there is concern that they will learn to coordinate on higher than competitive prices. However, this concern was primarily raised in…
Data is the central commodity of the digital economy. Unlike physical goods, it is non-rival, replicable at near-zero cost, and traded under heterogeneous licensing rules. These properties defy standard supply--demand theory and call for…
When energy customers schedule loads ahead of time, this information, if acquired by their energy retailer, can improve the retailer's load forecasts. Better forecasts lead to wholesale purchase decisions that are likely to result in lower…
This paper studies the provision of incentives for information acquisition. Information is costly for an agent to acquire and unobservable to a principal. We show that any Pareto optimal contract has a decomposition into a fraction of…
We develop a location analysis spatial model of firms' competition in multi-characteristics space, where consumers' opinions about the firms' products are distributed on multilayered networks. Firms do not compete on price but only on…
Price discrimination for maximizing expected profit is a well-studied concept in economics and there are various methods that achieve the maximum given the user type distribution and the budget constraints. In many applications,…
The data sponsored scheme allows the content provider to cover parts of the cellular data costs for mobile users. Thus the content service becomes appealing to more users and potentially generates more profit gain to the content provider.…
A common practice in many auctions is to offer bidders an opportunity to improve their bids, known as a Best and Final Offer (BAFO) stage. This final bid can depend on new information provided about either the asset or the competitors. This…
The seller of an asset has the option to buy hard information about the value of the asset from an intermediary. The seller can then disclose the acquired information before selling the asset in a competitive market. We study how the…
We study the mechanism design problem in the setting where agents are rewarded using information only. This problem is motivated by the increasing interest in secure multiparty computation techniques. More specifically, we consider the…
We modify the standard model of price competition with horizontally differentiated products, imperfect information, and search frictions by allowing consumers to flexibly acquire information about a product's match value during their…