Related papers: Modeling evidential cooperation in large worlds
In this paper we deal with linear production situations in which there is a limited common-pool resource, managed by an external agent. The profit that a producer, or a group of producers, can attain depends on the amount of common-pool…
Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong generative capabilities but remain prone to inconsistencies and hallucinations. We introduce Peer Elicitation Games (PEG), a training-free, game-theoretic framework for aligning LLMs…
We study optimal equilibria in multi-player games. An equilibrium is optimal for a player, if her payoff is maximal. A tempting approach to solving this problem is to seek optimal Nash equilibria, the standard form of equilibria where no…
A generalized model of games is proposed, in which cooperative games and non-cooperative games are special cases. Some games that are neither cooperative nor non-cooperative can be expressed and analyzed. The model is based on relationships…
Social dilemmas are situations in which collective welfare is at odds with individual gain. One widely studied example, due to the conflict it poses between human behaviour and game theoretic reasoning, is the Traveler's Dilemma. The…
Competitive resource allocation between adversarial decision makers arises in a wide spectrum of real-world applications such as in communication systems, cyber-physical systems security, as well as financial, political, and electoral…
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…
Game-theoretic techniques and equilibria analysis facilitate the design and verification of competitive systems. While algorithmic complexity of equilibria computation has been extensively studied, practical implementation and application…
We develop an equilibrium framework that relaxes the standard assumption that people have a correctly-specified view of their environment. Each player is characterized by a (possibly misspecified) subjective model, which describes the set…
Large Language Models (LLMs) show significant potential in economic and strategic interactions, where communication via natural language is often prevalent. This raises key questions: Do LLMs behave rationally? How do they perform compared…
Recently Bramoulle and Kranton presented a model for the provision of public goods over a network and showed the existence of a class of Nash equilibria called specialized equilibria wherein some agents exert maximum effort while other…
An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences…
A player's payoff is modeled as consisting of two parts: a rational-value part and a distortion-value part. It is argued that the (total) payoff function should be used to explain and predict the behaviors of the players, while the rational…
This note shows that under the unrestricted domain, there exists a choice liberal and Nash implementable social choice rule if and only if there are at least three players and the outcome set is at least twice as large as the player set. A…
Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…
The emergence of cooperation figures among the main goal of game theory in competitive-cooperative environments. Potential games have long been hinted as viable alternatives to study realistic player behavior. Here, we expand the potential…
Predicting how cooperative behavior arises in the thermodynamic limit is one of the outstanding problems in evolutionary game theory. For two player games, cooperation is seldom the Nash equilibrium. However, in the thermodynamic limit…
Coalescence, as a kind of ubiquitous group behavior in the nature and society, means that agents, companies or other substances keep consensus in states and act as a whole. This paper considers coalescence for n rational agents with…
The increasing prevalence of large language models (LLMs) is influencing global value systems. However, these models frequently exhibit a pronounced WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) cultural bias due to lack of…
In a society of multiple individuals, if everybody is only interested in maximizing his own payoff, will there exist any equilibrium for the society? John Nash proved more than 50 years ago that an equilibrium always exists such that nobody…