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We initiate the study of indivisible chore allocation for agents with asymmetric shares. The fairness concept we focus on is the weighted natural generalization of maxmin share: WMMS fairness and OWMMS fairness. We first highlight the fact…
We consider fair allocation of $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents of equal entitlements, with submodular valuation functions. Previously, Seddighin and Seddighin [{\em Artificial Intelligence} 2024] proved the existence of allocations that…
In allocation problems, a given set of goods are assigned to agents in such a way that the social welfare is maximised, that is, the largest possible global worth is achieved. When goods are indivisible, it is possible to use money…
Fair allocation of indivisible goods studies allocating $m$ goods among $n$ agents in a fair manner. While fairness is a fundamental requirement in many real-world applications, it often conflicts with (economic) efficiency. This raises a…
This paper considers a novel variant of the online fair division problem involving multiple agents in which a learner sequentially observes an indivisible item that has to be irrevocably allocated to one of the agents while satisfying a…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible items to budget-constrained agents, aiming to provide fairness and efficiency guarantees. Specifically, our goal is to ensure that the resulting allocation is envy-free up to any item (EFx)…
We study fair allocation of indivisible items, where the items are furnished with a set of conflicts, and agents are not permitted to receive conflicting items. This kind of constraint captures, for example, participating in events that…
We formulate the problem of fair and efficient completion of indivisible goods, defined as follows: Given a partial allocation of indivisible goods among agents, does there exist an allocation of the remaining goods (i.e., a completion)…
We consider the mechanism design problem of a principal allocating a single good to one of several agents without monetary transfers. Each agent desires the good and uses it to create value for the principal. We designate this value as the…
We study fair allocation of indivisible chores (i.e., items with non-positive value) among agents with additive valuations. An allocation is deemed fair if it is (approximately) equitable, which means that the disutilities of the agents are…
We study the allocation of indivisible goods among groups of agents using well-known fairness notions such as envy-freeness and proportionality. While these notions cannot always be satisfied, we provide several bounds on the optimal…
We consider the discrete assignment problem in which agents express ordinal preferences over objects and these objects are allocated to the agents in a fair manner. We use the stochastic dominance relation between fractional or randomized…
We study a simple problem of allocating common-value goods. The designer seeks to allocate the goods to as many unit-demand agents as possible without monetary transfers, while agents, who possess partial private information about the…
A canonical setting for non-monetary online resource allocation is one where agents compete over multiple rounds for a single item per round, with i.i.d. valuations and additive utilities across rounds. With $n$ symmetric agents, a natural…
We consider fair allocation of a set $M$ of indivisible goods to $n$ equally-entitled agents, with no monetary transfers. Every agent $i$ has a valuation $v_i$ from some given class of valuation functions. A share $s$ is a function that…
We divide efficiently a pile of indivisible goods in common property, using cash transfers to ensure fairness among agents with utility linear in money. We compare three cognitively feasible and privacy preserving division rules in terms of…
We study an online fair division setting, where goods arrive one at a time and there is a fixed set of $n$ agents, each of whom has an additive valuation function over the goods. Once a good appears, the value each agent has for it is…
We consider the problem of fair allocation of $m$ indivisible goods to $n$ agents with either subadditive or XOS valuations, in the arbitrary entitlement case. As fairness notions, we consider the anyprice share (APS) ex-post, and the…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents with weights corresponding to their entitlements. Previous work has shown that, when agents have binary additive valuations, the maximum weighted Nash welfare rule is…
We consider an assignment problem that has aspects of fair division as well as social choice. In particular, we investigate the problem of assigning a small subset from a set of indivisible items to multiple players so that the chosen…