Related papers: A Survey Report on Hardware Trojan Detection by Mu…
Side-channel based instruction disassembly has been proposed as a low-cost and non-invasive approach for security applications such as IP infringement detection, code flow analysis, malware detection, and reconstructing unknown code from…
In this paper, we will demonstrate Hardware Trojan Attacks on four different digital designs implemented on FPGA. The hardware trojan is activated based on special logical and reduction-based operations on vectors which makes the…
Power side-channel attacks (SCAs) have become a major concern to the security community due to their non-invasive feature, low-cost, and effectiveness in extracting secret information from hardware implementation of cryto algorithms.…
Fabrication-less design houses outsource their designs to 3rd party foundries to lower fabrication cost. However, this creates opportunities for a rogue in the foundry to introduce hardware Trojans, which stay inactive most of the time and…
Hardware Trojans can inflict harm on wireless networks by exploiting the link margins inherent in communication systems. We investigate a setting in which, alongside a legitimate communication link, a hardware Trojan embedded in the…
Although cryptographic algorithms may be mathematically secure, it is often possible to leak secret information from the implementation of the algorithms. Timing and power side-channel vulnerabilities are some of the most widely considered…
Recently, Haider et al. introduced the first rigorous hardware Trojan detection algorithm called HaTCh. The foundation of HaTCh is a formal framework of hardware Trojan design, which formally characterizes all the hardware Trojans based on…
In the evolving landscape of integrated circuit design, detecting Hardware Trojans (HTs) within a multi entity based design cycle presents significant challenges. This research proposes an innovative machine learning-based methodology for…
Security vulnerability analysis of Integrated Circuits using conventional design-time validation and verification techniques (like simulations, emulations, etc.) is generally a computationally intensive task and incomplete by nature,…
Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) is the most essential component for polynomial multiplications used in lattice-based Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms such as Kyber, Dilithium, NTRU etc. However, side-channel attacks (SCA) and…
This paper discusses the possible introduction of hidden reliability defects during CMOS foundry fabrication processes that may lead to accelerated wearout of the devices. These hidden defects or hardware Trojans can be created by deviation…
Electronic Design Automation (EDA) industry heavily reuses third party IP cores. These IP cores are vulnerable to insertion of Hardware Trojans (HTs) at design time by third party IP core providers or by malicious insiders in the design…
Side-channel attacks on mobile devices have gained increasing attention since their introduction in 2007. While traditional side-channel attacks, such as power analysis attacks and electromagnetic analysis attacks, required physical…
The increase in the number of counterfeit and recycled microelectronic chips in recent years has created significant security and safety concerns in various applications. Hence, detecting such counterfeit chips in electronic systems is…
Side-channel attacks are important security challenges as they reveal sensitive information about on-chip activities. Among such attacks, the thermal side-channel has been shown to disclose the activities of key functional blocks and even…
Side-channel attacks try to extract secret information from a system by analyzing different side-channel signatures, such as power consumption, electromagnetic emanation, thermal dissipation, acoustics, time, etc. Power-based side-channel…
As industry moves toward chiplet-based designs, the insertion of hardware Trojans poses a significant threat to the security of these systems. These systems rely heavily on cache coherence for coherent data communication, making coherence…
In cache-based side channel attacks, an attacker infers information about the victim based on the presence, or lack thereof, of one or more cachelines. Determining a cacheline's presence, which we refer to as "reading the signal", typically…
Out-of-band screening of microcontrollers is a major gap in semiconductor supply chain security. High-assurance techniques such as X-ray and destructive reverse engineering are accurate but slow and expensive, hindering comprehensive…
Secret-dependent timing behavior in cryptographic implementations has resulted in exploitable vulnerabilities, undermining their security. Over the years, numerous tools to automatically detect timing leakage or even to prove their absence…