Related papers: Transaction Fee Mechanism Design with Active Block…
The goal of this paper is to rigorously interrogate conventional wisdom about centralization in block-building (due to, e.g., MEV and private order flow) and the outsourcing of block-building by validators to specialists (i.e.,…
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) refers to excess value captured by miners (or validators) from users in a cryptocurrency network. This excess value often comes from reordering users' transactions to maximize fees or from inserting new…
We consider a refinement to the notions of collusion-resistance in transaction fee mechanisms. In particular, we require that the collusion is by itself incentive-compatible and individually rational to all of its participants. We then…
Traditional single-proposer blockchains suffer from miner extractable value (MEV), where validators exploit their serial monopoly on transaction inclusion and ordering to extract rents from users. While there have been many developments at…
We investigate the market microstructure of Automated Market Makers (AMMs), the most prominent type of blockchain-based decentralized exchanges. We show that the order execution mechanism yields token value loss for liquidity providers if…
In this paper, we present a pricing mechanism that aligns incentives of agents who exchange resources on a decentralized ledger with the goal of maximizing transaction throughput. Subdividing a blockchain ledger into shards promises to…
Censorship resistance is one of the core value proposition of blockchains. A recurring design pattern aimed at providing censorship resistance is enabling multiple proposers to contribute inputs into block construction. Notably, Fork-Choice…
We develop a general and practical framework to address the problem of the optimal design of dynamic fee mechanisms for multiple blockchain resources. Our framework allows to compute policies that optimally trade-off between adjusting…
Blockchains face inherent limitations when communicating outside their own ecosystem, largely due to the Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) 3f+1 security model. Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are a promising mitigation because they allow…
Maximal extractable value (MEV) in which block proposers unethically gain profits by manipulating the order in which transactions are included within a block, is a key challenge facing blockchains such as Ethereum today. Left unchecked, MEV…
The convergence of mobile edge computing (MEC) and blockchain is transforming the current computing services in mobile networks, by offering task offloading solutions with security enhancement empowered by blockchain mining. Nevertheless,…
Blockchain enables peer-to-peer transactions in cyberspace without a trusted third party. The rapid growth of Ethereum and smart contract blockchains generally calls for well-designed Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs) to allocate limited…
MEV attacks have been an omnipresent evil in the blockchain world, an implicit tax that uninformed users pay for using the service. The problem arises from the miners' ability to reorder and insert arbitrary transactions in the blocks they…
Blockchain networks are facing increasingly heterogeneous computational demands, and in response, protocol designers have started building specialized infrastructure to supply that demand. This paper introduces Resonance: a new kind of…
Optimistic responsiveness -- the ability of a consensus protocol to operate at the speed of the network -- is widely used in consensus protocol design to optimize latency and throughput. However, blockchain applications incentivize…
Development of blockchain smart contracts is more difficult than mainstream software development because the underlying blockchain infrastructure poses additional complexity. To ease the developer's task of writing smart contract, as other…
Existing permissionless blockchain solutions rely on peer-to-peer propagation mechanisms, where nodes in a network transfer transaction they received to their neighbors. Unfortunately, there is no explicit incentive for such transaction…
Blockchains offer strong security guarantees, but they cannot protect the ordering of transactions. Powerful players, such as miners, sequencers, and sophisticated bots, can reap significant profits by selectively including, excluding, or…
Block space on the blockchain is scarce and must be allocated efficiently through block building. However, Ethereum's current block-building ecosystem, MEV-Boost, has become highly centralized due to integration, which distorts competition,…
We develop a dynamic model of the Bitcoin market where users set fees themselves and miners decide whether to operate and whom to validate based on those fees. Our analysis reveals how, in equilibrium, users adjust their bids in response to…