Related papers: Noisy Games: A Study on the Effect of Noise on Gam…
Misinformation has become a significant issue in today's society, with the proliferation of false information through various mediums such as social media and traditional news sources. The rapid spread of misinformation has made it…
We study interactions between agents in multi-agent systems, in which the agents are misinformed with regards to the game that they play, essentially having a subjective and incorrect understanding of the setting, without being aware of it.…
Global games form a subclass of games with incomplete information where a set of agents decide actions against a regime with an underlying fundamental $\theta$ representing its power. Each agent has access to an independent noisy…
Evolutionary game theory offers a general framework to study how behaviors evolve by social learning in a population. This body of theory can accommodate a range of social dilemmas, or games, as well as real-world complexities such as…
Communication is rarely perfect, but rather prone to error of transmission and reception. Often the origin of these errors cannot be properly quantified and is thus imprecisely known. We analyze the impact of an ambiguous noise which may…
In the cybersecurity setting, defenders are often at the mercy of their detection technologies and subject to the information and experiences that individual analysts have. In order to give defenders an advantage, it is important to…
An abundance of literature has shown that the injection of noise into complex socio-economic systems can improve their resilience. This study aims to understand whether the same applies in the context of information diffusion in social…
Rapid spread of harmful misinformation has led to a dire need for effective media literacy interventions, to which educational games have been suggested as a possible solution. Researchers and educators have created several games that…
Coordination games admit two types of equilibria: pure equilibria, where all players successfully coordinate their actions, and mixed equilibria, where players frequently experience miscoordination. The existing literature shows that under…
Motivated by the scarcity of accurate payoff feedback in practical applications of game theory, we examine a class of learning dynamics where players adjust their choices based on past payoff observations that are subject to noise and…
We study how partial information about scoring rules affects fairness in strategic learning settings. In strategic learning, a learner deploys a scoring rule, and agents respond strategically by modifying their features -- at some cost --…
In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and…
We analyse the strategy equilibrium of dilemma games considering a payoff matrix affected by small and random perturbations on the off-diagonal. Notably, a recent work [1] reported that, while cooperation is sustained by perturbations…
Repeated game theory has been one of the most prevailing tools for understanding the long-run relationships, which are footstones in building human society. Recent works have revealed a new set of "zero-determinant (ZD)" strategies, which…
We extend recent analyses of stochastic effects in game dynamical learning to cases of multi-player games, and to games defined on networked structures. By means of an expansion in the noise strength we consider the weak-noise limit, and…
In games with incomplete and ambiguous information, rational behavior depends not only on fundamental ambiguity (ambiguity about states) but also on strategic ambiguity (ambiguity about others' actions), which further induces hierarchies of…
We study stochastic effects on the lagging anchor dynamics, a reinforcement learning algorithm used to learn successful strategies in iterated games, which is known to converge to Nash points in the absence of noise. The dynamics is…
We study Bayesian coordination games where agents receive noisy private information over the game's payoff structure, and over each others' actions. If private information over actions is precise, we find that agents can coordinate on…
Players (people, firms, states, etc.) have privacy concerns that may affect their choice of actions in strategic settings. We use a variant of signaling games to model this effect and study its relation to pooling behavior,…
This paper studies a communication game between an uninformed decision maker and two perfectly informed senders with conflicting interests. Senders can misreport information at a cost that increases with the size of the misrepresentation.…