Related papers: Synthesising Full-Information Protocols
Grim-trigger strategies are a fundamental mechanism for sustaining equilibria in iterated games: the players cooperate along an agreed path, and as soon as one player deviates, the others form a coalition to play him down to his minmax…
We study synthesis problems with constraints in partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs), where the objective is to compute a strategy for an agent that is guaranteed to satisfy certain safety and performance specifications.…
Scenarios, or Message Sequence Charts, offer an intuitive way of describing the desired behaviors of a distributed protocol. In this paper we propose a new way of specifying finite-state protocols using scenarios: we show that it is…
Nash equilibrium is a central solution concept for reasoning about self-interested agents. We address the problem of synthesizing Nash equilibria in two-player deterministic games on graphs, where players have private, partially-ordered…
Strategic deception is an act of manipulating the opponent's perception to gain strategic advantages. In this paper, we study synthesis of deceptive winning strategies in two-player turn-based zero-sum reachability games on graphs with…
An important feature of a dynamic game is its monitoring structure namely, what the players effectively see from the played actions. We consider games with arbitrary monitoring structures. One of the purposes of this paper is to know to…
We study \emph{partial-information} two-player turn-based games on graphs with omega-regular objectives, when the partial-information player has \emph{limited memory}. Such games are a natural formalization for reactive synthesis when the…
We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information and informational externalities. In these games, two states are chosen at the outset, and players get private information on the pair, before engaging in repeated…
We consider the problem of resolving contention in communication networks with selfish users. In a \textit{contention game} each of $n \geq 2$ identical players has a single information packet that she wants to transmit using one of $k \geq…
We provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which a convex set is approachable in a game with partial monitoring, i.e.\ where players do not observe their opponents' moves but receive random signals. This condition is an extension…
In two-player finite-state stochastic games of partial observation on graphs, in every state of the graph, the players simultaneously choose an action, and their joint actions determine a probability distribution over the successor states.…
This paper considers an infinitely repeated three-player Bayesian game with lack of information on two sides, in which an informed player plays two zero-sum games simultaneously at each stage against two uninformed players. This is a…
We consider perfect-information reachability stochastic games for 2 players on infinite graphs. We identify a subclass of such games, and prove two interesting properties of it: first, Player Max always has optimal strategies in games from…
We compare two approaches for modelling imperfect information in infinite games by using finite-state automata. The first, more standard approach views information as the result of an observation process driven by a sequential Mealy…
We introduce a formalism modelling communication of distributed agents strictly in continuous-time. Within this framework, we study the problem of synthesising local strategies for individual agents such that a specified set of goal states…
Information asymmetry in games enables players with the information advantage to manipulate others' beliefs by strategically revealing information to other players. This work considers a double-sided information asymmetry in a Bayesian…
We consider the probabilistic planning problem for a defender (P1) who can jointly query the sensors and take control actions to reach a set of goal states while being aware of possible sensor attacks by an adversary (P2) who has perfect…
Zero-sum asymmetric games model decision making scenarios involving two competing players who have different information about the game being played. A particular case is that of nested information, where one (informed) player has superior…
Limited lookahead has been studied for decades in perfect-information games. We initiate a new direction via two simultaneous deviation points: generalization to imperfect-information games and a game-theoretic approach. We study how one…
We unify standard frameworks for approachability both in full or partial monitoring by defining a new abstract game, called the "purely informative game", where the outcome at each stage is the maximal information players can obtain,…