Related papers: Order preservation with dummies in the musseum pas…
A quickest change detection problem is considered in a sensor network with observations whose statistical dependency structure across the sensors before and after the change is described by a decomposable graphical model (DGM). Distributed…
We study the mechanism design problem of allocating a set of indivisible items without monetary transfers. Despite the vast literature on this very standard model, it still remains unclear how do truthful mechanisms look like. We focus on…
The decidability of axiomatic extensions of the modal logic K with modal reduction principles, i.e. axioms of the form $\Diamond^{k} p \rightarrow \Diamond^{n} p$, has remained a long-standing open problem. In this paper, we make…
We provides some new equivalent forms of collection principle over some very weak set theories after reviewing the existing ones.
This thesis investigates the central role of homomorphism problems (structure-preserving maps) in two complementary domains: database querying over finite, graph-shaped data, and constraint solving over (potentially infinite) structures.…
We generalize current known distribution results on Shanks--R\'enyi prime number races to the case where arbitrarily many residue classes are involved. Our method handles both the classical case that goes back to Chebyshev and function…
We consider the problem of rationalizing choice data by a preference satisfying an arbitrary collection of invariance axioms. Examples of such axioms include quasilinearity, homotheticity, independence-type axioms for mixture spaces,…
In this paper, we focus on how to dynamically allocate a divisible resource fairly among n players who arrive and depart over time. The players may have general heterogeneous valuations over the resource. It is known that the exact…
In display advertising, a small group of sellers and bidders face each other in up to 10 12 auctions a day. In this context, revenue maximisation via monopoly price learning is a high-value problem for sellers. By nature, these auctions are…
Purpose: We propose a model to present a possible mechanism for obtaining sizeable behavioural structures by simulating an agent based on the evolutionary public good game with available social learning. Methods: The model considered a…
In this work, we aim at efficiently solving a parametrized family of optimal transport problems by using model order reduction methods. We propose a reduced-order model by adding to the primal (respectively dual) version of the…
The planner wants to give k identical, indivisible objects to the top k valuation agents at zero costs. Each agent knows her own valuation of the object and whether it is among the top k. Modify the (k+1)st-price sealed-bid auction by…
We initiate the study of how auction design affects the division of surplus among buyers. We propose a parsimonious measure for equity and apply it to the family of standard auctions for homogeneous goods. Our surplus-equitable mechanism is…
It is generally believed that in a situation where individual and collective interests are in conflict, the availability of optional participation is a key mechanism to maintain cooperation. Surprisingly, this effect is sensitive to the use…
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of $m$ goods among $n$ agents in the asymptotic setting, where each item's value for each agent is drawn from an underlying joint distribution. Prior works have shown that if this distribution…
The univalence axiom expresses the principle of extensionality for dependent type theory. However, if we simply add the univalence axiom to type theory, then we lose the property of canonicity - that every closed term computes to a…
Prior work studies the question of ``fairly'' ordering transactions in a replicated state machine. Each of $n$ replicas receives transactions in a possibly different order, and the system must aggregate the observed orderings into a single…
A popular variant of the collector's problem is the following: Assume there are $N$ different types of coupons with equal occurring probabilities. There is one main collector who collects coupons. When she gets a "double," she gives it to…
We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible goods to $n$ agents, with no transfers. When agents have equal entitlements, the well established notion of the maximin share (MMS) serves as an attractive fairness criterion, where…
We consider transferable-utility profit-sharing games that arise from settings in which agents need to jointly choose one of several alternatives, and may use transfers to redistribute the welfare generated by the chosen alternative. One…