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In many two-sided labor markets, interviews are conducted before matches are formed. The growing number of interviews in medical residency markets has increased demand for signaling mechanisms, where applicants send a limited number of…
Gale and Sotomayor (1985) have shown that in the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm (1962), the proposed-to side W (referred to as women there) can strategically force the W-optimal stable matching as the M-optimal one by truncating their…
In school choice problems, the motivation for students' welfare (efficiency) is restrained by concerns to respect schools' priorities (fairness). Among the fair matchings, even the best one in terms of welfare (SOSM) is inefficient.…
Schulze and ranked-pairs elections have received much attention recently, and the former has quickly become a quite widely used election system. For many cases these systems have been proven resistant to bribery, control, or manipulation,…
We examine some agreement-dynamics models that are placed on directed random graphs. In such systems a fraction of sites $\exp(-z)$, where $z$ is the average degree, becomes permanently fixed or flickering. In the Voter model, which has no…
In two-sided matching market, when the regional constraints are present, the deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm suffers from undesirable inefficiency due to the artificial allocation of the regional caps among hospitals. We show that, given…
Stable matching in a community consisting of $N$ men and $N$ women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and…
Machine learning algorithms enable advanced decision making in contemporary intelligent systems. Research indicates that there is a tradeoff between their model performance and explainability. Machine learning models with higher performance…
The classical theory of efficient allocations of an aggregate endowment in a pure-exchange economy has hitherto primarily focused on the Pareto-efficiency of allocations, under the implicit assumption that transfers between agents are…
We consider the pricing of derivatives in a setting with trading restrictions, but without any probabilistic assumptions on the underlying model, in discrete and continuous time. In particular, we assume that European put or call options…
Randomized experiments can be susceptible to selection bias due to potential non-compliance by the participants. While much of the existing work has studied compliance as a static behavior, we propose a game-theoretic model to study…
We study the problem of coalitional manipulation---where $k$ manipulators try to manipulate an election on $m$ candidates---under general scoring rules, with a focus on the Borda protocol. We do so both in the weighted and unweighted…
The characterization of the "most connected" nodes in static or slowly evolving complex networks has helped in understanding and predicting the behavior of social, biological, and technological networked systems, including their robustness…
Comparisons of different treatments or production processes are the goals of a significant fraction of applied research. Unsurprisingly, two-sample problems play a main role in Statistics through natural questions such as `Is the the new…
We consider a hidden-action principal-agent model, in which actions require different amounts of effort, and the agent privately knows his ability that determines his cost of effort. We show that linear contracts admit approximation…
We study a dynamic asset pricing problem in which a representative agent is ambiguous about the aggregate endowment growth rate and trades a risky stock, human capital, and a risk-free asset to maximize her preference value of consumption…
We study the classical, two-sided stable marriage problem under pairwise preferences. In the most general setting, agents are allowed to express their preferences as comparisons of any two of their edges and they also have the right to…
We study many-to-one matching problems between institutions and individuals, where each institution may be matched to multiple individuals. The matching market includes couples, who view pairs of institutions as complementary. Institutions'…
We consider the design of experiments to evaluate treatments that are administered by self-interested agents, each seeking to achieve the highest evaluation and win the experiment. For example, in an advertising experiment, a company wishes…
There are growing concerns that algorithms, which increasingly make or influence important decisions pertaining to individuals, might produce outcomes that discriminate against protected groups. We study such fairness concerns in the…