Related papers: When Bidders Are DAOs
In decentralized systems, nodes often need to coordinate to access shared resources in a fair manner. One approach to perform such arbitration is to rely on auction mechanisms. Although there is an extensive literature that studies…
In economics, there are many ways to describe the interaction between a "seller" and a "buyer". The most common one, with which we interact almost every day, is selling for a fixed price. This option is perfect for selling a mass product,…
Auction has been used to allocate resources or tasks to processes, machines or other autonomous entities in distributed systems. When different bidders have different demands and valuations on different types of resources or tasks, the…
We study the problem of designing a two-sided market (double auction) to maximize the gains from trade (social welfare) under the constraints of (dominant-strategy) incentive compatibility and budget-balance. Our goal is to do so for an…
In markets such as digital advertising auctions, bidders want to maximize value rather than payoff. This is different to the utility functions typically assumed in auction theory and leads to different strategies and outcomes. We refer to…
We introduce a new family of mechanisms for one-sided matching markets, denoted pick-an-object (PAO) mechanisms. When implementing an allocation rule via PAO, agents are asked to pick an object from individualized menus. These choices may…
This report explores the often-overlooked cultural and social dynamics shaping participation and power in DAOs. Drawing on qualitative interviews and ethnographic observations, it shows how factors such as financial privilege, informal…
The Maker Protocol is a decentralized finance application that enables collateralized lending. The application uses open-bid, second-price auctions to complete its loan liquidation process. In this paper, we develop a bidding function for…
Randomized mechanisms, which map a set of bids to a probability distribution over outcomes rather than a single outcome, are an important but ill-understood area of computational mechanism design. We investigate the role of randomized…
While previously a nascent theoretical construct, decentralized autonomous organizations have grown rapidly in recent years. DAOs typically emerge around the management of decentralized financial applications and thus benefit from the rapid…
Simultaneous item auctions are simple procedures for allocating items to bidders with potentially complex preferences over different item sets. In a simultaneous auction, every bidder submits bids on all items simultaneously. The allocation…
A decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) is a governing entity that empowers its stakeholders (i.e., users who hold one or more of its tokens) to manage blockchain-based protocols (i.e., smart contracts) collaboratively. The governance…
Traditional facility management often relies on centralized decision-making structures that limit stakeholder participation, leading to misalignment with occupant needs and reduced satisfaction. This paper proposes a novel blockchain- and…
We propose an operating envelopes (OEs) aware energy community market mechanism that dynamically charges/rewards its members based on two-part pricing. The OEs are imposed exogenously by a regulated distribution system operator (DSO) on the…
We investigate approximately optimal mechanisms in settings where bidders' utility functions are non-linear; specifically, convex, with respect to payments (such settings arise, for instance, in procurement auctions for energy). We provide…
We are interested in the setting where a seller sells sequentially arriving items, one per period, via a dynamic auction. At the beginning of each period, each buyer draws a private valuation for the item to be sold in that period and this…
We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…
Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) rely on governance mechanism without centralized leadership. This paper presents an empirical study of user behavior in governance for a variety of DAOs, ranging from DeFi to gaming, using the…
We study the problem of a buyer (aka auctioneer) who gains stochastic rewards by procuring multiple units of a service or item from a pool of heterogeneous strategic agents. The reward obtained for a single unit from an allocated agent…
As autobidding systems increasingly dominate online advertising auctions, characterizing their long-term dynamical behavior is brought to the fore. In this paper, we examine the dynamics of autobidders who optimize value subject to a…