Related papers: Proportional Aggregation of Preferences for Sequen…

As automated decision making and decision assistance systems become common in everyday life, research on the prevention or mitigation of potential harms that arise from decisions made by these systems has proliferated. However, various…

Societies often rely on human experts to take a wide variety of decisions affecting their members, from jail-or-release decisions taken by judges and stop-and-frisk decisions taken by police officers to accept-or-reject decisions taken by…

We initiate the work towards a comprehensive picture of the smoothed satisfaction of voting axioms, to provide a finer and more realistic foundation for comparing voting rules. We adopt the smoothed social choice framework, where an…

The basic idea of voting protocols is that nodes query a sample of other nodes and adjust their own opinion throughout several rounds based on the proportion of the sampled opinions. In the classic model, it is assumed that all nodes have…

A voting center is in charge of collecting and aggregating voter preferences. In an iterative process, the center sends comparison queries to voters, requesting them to submit their preference between two items. Voters might discuss the…

In multiwinner approval voting, the goal is to select $k$-member committees based on voters' approval ballots. A well-studied concept of proportionality in this context is the justified representation (JR) axiom, which demands that no large…

Aggregating agent preferences into a collective decision is an important step in many problems (e.g., hiring, elections, peer review) and across areas of computer science (e.g., reinforcement learning, recommender systems). As Social Choice…

We study voting rules for participatory budgeting, where a group of voters collectively decides which projects should be funded using a common budget. We allow the projects to have arbitrary costs, and the voters to have arbitrary additive…

May's Theorem [K. O. May, Econometrica 20 (1952) 680-684] characterizes majority voting on two alternatives as the unique preferential voting method satisfying several simple axioms. Here we show that by adding some desirable axioms to…

We study the voting problem with two alternatives where voters' preferences depend on a not-directly-observable state variable. While equilibria in the one-round voting mechanisms lead to a good decision, they are usually hard to compute…

Sequential recommendation aims to choose the most suitable items for a user at a specific timestamp given historical behaviors. Existing methods usually model the user behavior sequence based on the transition-based methods like Markov…

We contribute to the programme of lifting proportionality axioms from the multi-winner voting setting to participatory budgeting. We define novel proportionality axioms for participatory budgeting and test them on known…

We consider synchronous iterative voting, where voters are given the opportunity to strategically choose their ballots depending on the outcome deduced from the previous collective choices.We propose two settings for synchronous iterative…

Election rules are formal processes that aggregate voters preferences, typically to select a single candidate, called the winner. Most of the election rules studied in the literature require the voters to rank the candidates from the most…

We extend Approval voting to the settings where voters may have intransitive preferences. The major obstacle to applying Approval voting in these settings is that voters are not able to clearly determine who they should approve or…

Voting is the aggregation of individual preferences in order to select a winning alternative. Selection of a winner is accomplished via a voting rule, e.g., rank-order voting, majority rule, plurality rule, approval voting. Which voting…

Platforms for online civic participation rely heavily on methods for condensing thousands of comments into a relevant handful, based on whether participants agree or disagree with them. These methods should guarantee fair representation of…

We consider a group of voters that needs to decide between two candidates. We propose a novel family of neutral and strategy-proof rules, which we call sequential unanimity rules. By demonstrating their formal equivalence to the M-winning…

We study online temporal voting, where a group of voters submit 0/1 approvals on sets of alternatives that arrive online over multiple rounds and a single alternative is chosen in each round. We introduce online variants of two well-known…

Proportional representation (PR) is one of the central principles in voting. Elegant rules with compelling PR axiomatic properties have the potential to be adopted for several important collective decision making settings. I survey some…