Related papers: On Adaptive-Gain Control of Replicator Dynamics in…
How can a social planner adaptively incentivize selfish agents who are learning in a strategic environment to induce a socially optimal outcome in the long run? We propose a two-timescale learning dynamics to answer this question in both…
The balance of exploration versus exploitation (EvE) is a key issue on evolutionary computation. In this paper we will investigate how an adaptive controller aimed to perform Operator Selection can be used to dynamically manage the EvE…
Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games with quenched inhomogeneities in the spatial dynamical rules are considered. The players following one of the two pure strategies (cooperation or defection) are distributed on a two-dimensional lattice.…
Applying the concepts and formalisms from Evolutionary Game Theory to the data regime, the fundamental paradigms of Evolutionary Data Theory are introduced. Interpreting data in matrix form as evolutionary entities, input data is mapped to…
Game theory ideas provide a useful framework for studying evolutionary dynamics in a well-mixed environment. This approach, however, typically enforces a strictly fixed overall population size, deemphasizing natural growth processes. We…
In the future, artificial learning agents are likely to become increasingly widespread in our society. They will interact with both other learning agents and humans in a variety of complex settings including social dilemmas. We consider the…
We present detailed numerical results for a modified form of the so-called Minority Game, which provides a simplified model of a competitive market. Each agent has a limited set of strategies, and competes to be in a minority. An…
In this chapter, we deal with some specific domains of applications to game theory. This is one of the major class of models in the new approaches of modelling in the economic domain. For that, we use genetic automata which allow to build…
We study the quality of outcomes in repeated games when the population of players is dynamically changing and participants use learning algorithms to adapt to the changing environment. Game theory classically considers Nash equilibria of…
Continuously changing environments have a paramount role in the evolution of cooperative behavior. Previous works have shown that the transitions among different games, as the feedback between behaviors and environments, can promote…
We introduce a new setting where a population of agents, each modelled by a finite-state system, are controlled uniformly: the controller applies the same action to every agent. The framework is largely inspired by the control of a…
Motivated by the fact that the same social dilemma can be perceived differently by different players, we here study evolutionary multigames in structured populations. While the core game is the weak prisoner's dilemma, a fraction of the…
We live and cooperate in networks. However, links in networks only allow for pairwise interactions, thus making the framework suitable for dyadic games, but not for games that are played in groups of more than two players. Here, we study…
Adaptive dynamics describes a deterministic approximation of the evolution of scalar- and function-valued traits. Applying it to the team game developed by Menden-Deuer and Rowlett [Menden-Deuer & Rowlett 2019], we constructed an…
We investigate the spatial Public Goods Game in the presence of fitness-driven and conformity-driven agents. This framework usually considers only the former type of agents, i.e., agents that tend to imitate the strategy of their fittest…
The governance of common-pool resources has vital importance for sustainability. However, in the realistic management systems of common-pool resources, the institutions do not necessarily execute the management policies completely, which…
We analyze a simple model of adaptive competition which captures essential features of a variety of adaptive competitive systems in the social and biological sciences. Each of N agents, at each time step of a game, joins one of two groups.…
Over the past few decades, many works have studied the evolutionary dynamics of continuous games. However, previous works have primarily focused on two-player games with pairwise interactions. Indeed, group interactions rather than pairwise…
Modeling the purposeful behavior of imperfect agents from a small number of observations is a challenging task. When restricted to the single-agent decision-theoretic setting, inverse optimal control techniques assume that observed behavior…
We consider evolutionary dynamics for population games in which players have a continuum of strategies at their disposal. Models in this setting amount to infinite-dimensional differential equations evolving on the manifold of probability…