Related papers: Bidder Selection Problem in Position Auctions: A F…
We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored…
We resolve the complexity of revenue-optimal deterministic auctions in the unit-demand single-buyer Bayesian setting, i.e., the optimal item pricing problem, when the buyer's values for the items are independent. We show that the problem of…
$\newcommand{\cala}{\mathcal{A}}$ In MAXSPACE, given a set of ads $\cala$, one wants to schedule a subset ${\cala'\subseteq\cala}$ into $K$ slots ${B_1, \dots, B_K}$ of size $L$. Each ad ${A_i \in \cala}$ has a size $s_i$ and a frequency…
We study the online learning problem of a bidder who participates in repeated auctions. With the goal of maximizing his T-period payoff, the bidder determines the optimal allocation of his budget among his bids for $K$ goods at each period.…
In recent years, RTB(Real Time Bidding) becomes a popular online advertisement trading method. During the auction, each DSP(Demand Side Platform) is supposed to evaluate current opportunity and respond with an ad and corresponding bid…
Driven by the global decarbonization effort, the rapid integration of renewable energy into the conventional electricity grid presents new challenges and opportunities for the battery energy storage system (BESS) participating in the energy…
The Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP) is among the most famous NP-hard optimization problems. We design for this problem a randomized polynomial-time algorithm that computes a (1+eps)-approximation to the optimal tour, for any fixed eps>0,…
In \emph{Online Sorting}, an array of $n$ initially empty cells is given. At each time step $t$, an element $x_t \in [0,1]$ arrives and must be placed irrevocably into an empty cell without any knowledge of future arrivals. We aim to…
In \emph{Online Sorting}, an array of $n$ initially empty cells is given. At each time step $t$, an element $x_t \in [0,1]$ arrives and must be placed irrevocably into an empty cell without any knowledge of future arrivals. We aim to…
Simultaneous ascending auctions present agents with the exposure problem: bidding to acquire a bundle risks the possibility of obtaining an undesired subset of the goods. Auction theory provides little guidance for dealing with this…
As commerce shifts to digital marketplaces, platforms increasingly monetize traffic through Sponsored Shopping auctions. Unlike classic ``Sponsored Search", where an advertiser typically bids for a single link, these settings involve…
The E-commerce advertising platforms typically sell commercial traffic through either second-price auction (SPA) or first-price auction (FPA). SPA was historically prevalent due to its dominant strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC) for…
We present prior robust algorithms for a large class of resource allocation problems where requests arrive one-by-one (online), drawn independently from an unknown distribution at every step. We design a single algorithm that, for every…
For revenue and welfare maximization in single-dimensional Bayesian settings, Chawla et al. (STOC10) recently showed that sequential posted-price mechanisms (SPMs), though simple in form, can perform surprisingly well compared to the…
This paper studies the optimal solution of the classical problem of detecting the location of multiple image occurrences in a two-dimensional, noisy measurement. Assuming the image occurrences do not overlap, we formulate this task as a…
Combinatorial auctions (CA) are a well-studied area in algorithmic mechanism design. However, contrary to the standard model, empirical studies suggest that a bidder's valuation often does not depend solely on the goods assigned to him. For…
We consider the computational complexity of computing Bayes-Nash equilibria in first-price auctions, where the bidders' values for the item are drawn from a general (possibly correlated) joint distribution. We show that when the values and…
Iterative combinatorial auctions (CAs) are often used in multi-billion dollar domains like spectrum auctions, and speed of convergence is one of the crucial factors behind the choice of a specific design for practical applications. To…
We consider the fundamental problem of selecting $k$ out of $n$ random variables in a way that the expected highest or second-highest value is maximized. This question captures several applications where we have uncertainty about the…
Developing efficient sequential bidding strategies for repeated auctions is an important practical challenge in various marketing tasks. In this setting, the bidding agent obtains information, on both the value of the item at sale and the…