Related papers: A Two-Player Resource-Sharing Game with Asymmetric…

At a mixed Nash equilibrium, the payoff of a player does not depend on her own action, as long as her opponent sticks to his. In a periodic strategy, a concept developed in a previous paper (arXiv:1307.2035v4), in contrast, the own payoff…

We consider a gossip approach for finding a Nash equilibrium in a distributed multi-player network game. We extend previous results on Nash equilibrium seeking to the case when the players' cost functions may be affected by the actions of…

In many real-world settings agents engage in strategic interactions with multiple opposing agents who can employ a wide variety of strategies. The standard approach for designing agents for such settings is to compute or approximate a…

Distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problem for multi-coalition games has attracted increasing attention in recent years, but the research mainly focuses on the case without agreement demand within coalitions. This paper considers a…

In this paper, Nash equilibrium seeking among a network of players is considered. Different from many existing works on Nash equilibrium seeking in non-cooperative games, the players considered in this paper cannot directly observe the…

In this paper, we investigate informational asymmetries in the Colonel Blotto game, a game-theoretic model of competitive resource allocation between two players over a set of battlefields. The battlefield valuations are subject to…

This paper studies a class of network games with linear-quadratic payoffs and externalities exerted through a strictly concave interaction function. This class of game is motivated by the diminishing marginal effects with peer influences.…

Evolution of agents' dynamics of multiagent systems under consensus protocol in the face of jamming attacks is discussed, where centralized parties are able to influence the control signals of the agents. In this paper we focus on a…

We introduce a new variation of the m-player asymmetric Colonel Blotto game, where the n battles occur as sequential stages of the game, and the winner of each stage needs to spend resources for maintaining his win. The limited resources of…

In the classical communication setting multiple senders having access to the same source of information and transmitting it over channel(s) to a receiver in general leads to a decrease in estimation error at the receiver as compared with…

We introduce the notion of exchangeable equilibria of a symmetric bimatrix game, defined as those correlated equilibria in which players' strategy choices are conditionally independently and identically distributed given some hidden…

In two-player zero-sum stochastic games, where two competing players make decisions under uncertainty, a pair of optimal strategies is traditionally described by Nash equilibrium and computed under the assumption that the players have…

In this paper, I introduce a novel benchmark in games, super-Nash performance, and a solution concept, optimin, whereby players maximize their minimal payoff under unilateral profitable deviations by other players. Optimin achieves…

We study the convergence time of the best response dynamics in player-specific singleton congestion games. It is well known that this dynamics can cycle, although from every state a short sequence of best responses to a Nash equilibrium…

We propose an adaptive incentive mechanism that learns the optimal incentives in environments where players continuously update their strategies. Our mechanism updates incentives based on each player's externality, defined as the difference…

We show that the problem of deciding whether in a multi-player perfect information recursive game (i.e. a stochastic game with terminal rewards) there exists a stationary Nash equilibrium ensuring each player a certain payoff is Existential…

This paper studies random reshuffling (RR)-based distributed Nash equilibrium seeking for noncooperative games. The game is motivated as a sample-average approximation of an underlying expected-value stochastic game, while the algorithmic…

Studying games in the complete information model makes them analytically tractable. However, large $n$ player interactions are more realistically modeled as games of incomplete information, where players may know little to nothing about the…

This paper presents a game theoretic solution for joint channel allocation and power control in cognitive radio networks analyzed under the physical interference model. The objective is to find a distributed solution that maximizes the…

We investigate the problem of equilibrium computation for "large" $n$-player games. Large games have a Lipschitz-type property that no single player's utility is greatly affected by any other individual player's actions. In this paper, we…