Related papers: A multi-agent targeted trading equilibrium with tr…
We address the problem of executing large client orders in continuous double-auction markets under time and liquidity constraints. We propose a model predictive control (MPC) framework that balances three competing objectives: order…
We study an equilibrium-based continuous asset pricing problem for the securities market. In the previous work [16], we have shown that a certain price process, which is given by the solution to a forward backward stochastic differential…
This paper studies Markov perfect equilibria in a repeated duopoly model where sellers choose algorithms. An algorithm is a mapping from the competitor's price to own price. Once set, algorithms respond quickly. Customers arrive randomly…
This work solves the equilibrium price formation problem for the risky stock by combining mean-field game theory with the binomial tree framework, adapting the classic approach of Cox, Ross \& Rubinstein. For agents with exponential and…
How do rational agents self-organize when trying to connect to a common target? We study this question with a simple tree formation game which is related to the well-known fair single-source connection game by Anshelevich et al. (FOCS'04)…
We consider a financial market model which consists of a financial asset and a large number of interacting agents classified into many types. Different types of agents are heterogeneous in their price expectations. Each agent can change its…
We present an experimental and simulated model of a multi-agent stock market driven by a double auction order matching mechanism. Studying the effect of cumulative information on the performance of traders, we find a non monotonic…
This paper presents a simple method for a posteriori (historical) multi-variate multi-stage optimal trading under transaction costs and a diversification constraint. Starting from a given amount of money in some currency, we analyze the…
We study multi-agent contracts, in which a principal delegates a task to multiple agents and incentivizes them to exert effort. Prior research has mostly focused on maximizing the principal's utility, often resulting in highly disparate…
We study optimal execution in markets with transient price impact in a competitive setting with $N$ traders. Motivated by prior negative results on the existence of pure Nash equilibria, we consider randomized strategies for the traders and…
We study sequential multi-issue trading between two greedily rational agents who exchange resources from a finite set of categories. Each agent's utility depends on its allocation, but the offering agent does not know the responding agent's…
We introduce an interactive market setup with sequential auctions where agents receive variegated signals with a known deadline. The effects of differential information and mutual learning on the allocation of overall profit \& loss (P\&L)…
We study the fair allocation of indivisible items subject to conflict constraints. In this framework, the items are represented as the vertices of a graph, with edges corresponding to conflicts between pairs of items. Each agent is assigned…
There is a pervasive assumption that low latency access to an exchange is a key factor in the profitability of many high-frequency trading strategies. This belief is evidenced by the "arms race" undertaken by certain financial firms to…
The focus of this paper is on identifying the most effective selling strategy for pairs trading of stocks. In pairs trading, a long position is held in one stock while a short position is held in another. The goal is to determine the…
In this work we consider an agent based model in order to study the wealth distribution problem where the interchange is determined with a symmetric zero sum game. Simultaneously, the agents update their way of play trying to learn the…
In many two-sided markets, the parties to be matched have incomplete information about their characteristics. We consider the settings where the parties engaged are extremely patient and are interested in long-term partnerships. Hence, once…
We study risk-sharing equilibria with general convex costs on the agents' trading rates. For an infinite-horizon model with linear state dynamics and exogenous volatilities, we prove that the equilibrium returns mean-revert around their…
In this paper, we study inverse game theory (resp. inverse multiagent learning) in which the goal is to find parameters of a game's payoff functions for which the expected (resp. sampled) behavior is an equilibrium. We formulate these…
In many settings where multiple agents interact, the optimal choices for each agent depend heavily on the choices of the others. These coupled interactions are well-described by a general-sum differential game, in which players have…