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In this tutorial, we provide an introduction to machine learning methods for finding Nash equilibria in games with large number of agents. These types of problems are important for the operations research community because of their…
We use system-theoretic passivity methods to study evolutionary Nash equilibria learning in large populations of agents engaged in strategic, non-cooperative interactions. The agents follow learning rules (rules for short) that capture…
The Kelly or proportional allocation mechanism is a simple and efficient auction-based scheme that distributes an infinitely divisible resource proportionally to the agents bids. When agents are aware of the allocation rule, their…
The reasoning performance of large language models (LLMs) can be substantially improved by training them with reinforcement learning (RL). The RL objective for LLM training involves a regularization term, which is the reverse…
Large language models (LLMs) demonstrate strong reasoning abilities across mathematical, strategic, and linguistic tasks, yet little is known about how well they reason in dynamic, real-time, multi-agent scenarios, such as collaborative…
Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…
Motivated by applications to online advertising and recommender systems, we consider a game-theoretic model with delayed rewards and asynchronous, payoff-based feedback. In contrast to previous work on delayed multi-armed bandits, we focus…
Learning from repeated play in a fixed two-player zero-sum game is a classic problem in game theory and online learning. We consider a variant of this problem where the game payoff matrix changes over time, possibly in an adversarial…
This paper investigates the equilibrium convergence properties of a proposed algorithm for potential games with continuous strategy spaces in the presence of feedback delays, a main challenge in multi-agent systems that compromises the…
Several multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithms have been proposed to optimize agents decisions. Due to the complexity of the problem, the majority of the previously developed MARL algorithms assumed agents either had some…
The growing adoption of large language models (LLMs) presents potential for deeper understanding of human behaviours within game theory frameworks. Addressing research gap on multi-player competitive games, this paper examines the strategic…
We establish Nash equilibrium learning in large populations of noncooperative, strategic agents. Our analysis considers the broadest class to date of payoff mechanisms with first-order modifications, capable of modeling bounded rationality…
Economic ensembles can be modeled as networks of interacting agents whose be-haviors are described in terms of game theory. The evolutionary paradigm has been applied to two-person games to discover strategies in this context.…
Motivated by the scarcity of accurate payoff feedback in practical applications of game theory, we examine a class of learning dynamics where players adjust their choices based on past payoff observations that are subject to noise and…
Learning in games provides a powerful framework to design control policies for self-interested agents that may be coupled through their dynamics, costs, or constraints. We consider the case where the dynamics of the coupled system can be…
We address in this paper Reinforcement Learning (RL) among agents that are grouped into teams such that there is cooperation within each team but general-sum (non-zero sum) competition across different teams. To develop an RL method that…
We consider a class of concave continuous games in which the corresponding admissible strategy profile of each player underlies affine coupling constraints. We propose a novel algorithm that leads the relevant population dynamic toward Nash…
Offline multi-agent reinforcement learning in general-sum settings is challenged by the distribution shift between logged datasets and target equilibrium policies. While standard methods rely on manual pessimistic penalties, we demonstrate…
We develop a game-theoretic framework for predicting and steering the behavior of populations of large language models (LLMs) through Nash equilibrium (NE) analysis. To avoid the intractability of equilibrium computation in open-ended text…
Starting from a heuristic learning scheme for N-person games, we derive a new class of continuous-time learning dynamics consisting of a replicator-like drift adjusted by a penalty term that renders the boundary of the game's strategy space…