Related papers: Paradoxical Oddities in Two Multiwinner Elections …
The recently discovered Parrondo's paradox claims that two losing games can result, under random or periodic alternation of their dynamics, in a winning game: "losing+losing=winning". In this paper we follow Parrondo's philosophy of…
We consider voting on multiple independent binary issues. In addition, a weighting vector for each voter defines how important they consider each issue. The most natural way to aggregate the votes into a single unified proposal is…
We present a model of voting behaviour based on a version of aggregated overdispersed multinomial distributions; relative to a similar model by \citet{BP86}, our model is based on more realistic assumptions and free from certain…
Two losing gambling games, when alternated in a periodic or random fashion, can produce a winning game. This paradox has been inspired by certain physical systems capable of rectifying fluctuations: the so-called Brownian ratchets. In this…
There has been much recent work on multiwinner voting systems. However, sometimes a committee is highly structured, and if we want to vote for such a committee, our voting method should be more structured as well. We consider committees…
In many proportional parliamentary elections, electoral thresholds (typically 3-5%) are used to promote stability and governability by preventing the election of parties with very small representation. However, these thresholds often result…
Multi-winner approval elections are seen in a variety of settings ranging from academic societies and associations to public elections. In such elections, it is often the case that ballot-length restrictions are enforced; that is, where…
In real-world elections where voters cast preference ballots, voters often provide only a partial ranking of the candidates. Despite this empirical reality, prior social choice literature frequently analyzes fairness criteria under the…
We consider synchronous iterative voting, where voters are given the opportunity to strategically choose their ballots depending on the outcome deduced from the previous collective choices.We propose two settings for synchronous iterative…
Since the 1970s there has been a large number of countries that combine formal democratic institutions with authoritarian practices. Although in such countries the ruling elites may receive considerable voter support they often employ…
Many seemingly paradoxical effects are known in the predictions for outcomes of intermediate measurements made on pre- and post-selected quantum systems. Despite appearances, these effects do not demonstrate the impossibility of a…
A new viewpoint on electoral involvement is proposed from the study of the statistics of the proportions of abstentionists, blank and null, and votes according to list of choices, in a large number of national elections in different…
We study an ensemble of individuals playing the two games of the so-called Parrondo paradox. In our study, players are allowed to choose the game to be played by the whole ensemble in each turn. The choice cannot conform to the preferences…
If time travel is possible, it seems to inevitably lead to paradoxes. These include consistency paradoxes, such as the famous grandfather paradox, and bootstrap paradoxes, where something is created out of nothing. One proposed class of…
The goal of this paper is twofold. First and foremost, we aim to experimentally and quantitatively show that the choice of a multiwinner voting rule can play a crucial role on the way minorities are represented. We also test the possibility…
Parrondo's paradox is about a paradoxical game and gambling where two probabilistic losing games can be combined to form a winning game. While the counter intuitive game is interesting in itself, it can be thought of a discrete version of…
A Condorcet cycle election is an election (often called a Social Welfare Function, or SWF) between three candidates, where each voter ranks the three candidates according to a fixed cyclic order. Maskin showed that if such a SWF obeys the…
Mechanism design is concerned with settings where a policymaker (or social planner) faces the problem of aggregating the announced preferences of multiple agents into a collective (or social), system-wide decision. One of the most important…
We study the voting problem with two alternatives where voters' preferences depend on a not-directly-observable state variable. While equilibria in the one-round voting mechanisms lead to a good decision, they are usually hard to compute…
We visualize aggregate outputs of popular multiwinner voting rules--SNTV, STV, Bloc, k-Borda, Monroe, Chamberlin--Courant, and HarmonicBorda--for elections generated according to the two-dimensional Euclidean model. We consider three…